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PREFACE
THE first draft of this work was presented to the
University of London in December 1921, under tile title
of "The Arab Coilquest of Transoxania", as a tllesis for
t h e degree of Master of Arts, and was al~provedby the
Senate in January 1922, for publication as such. During
t h e year my attention was taken up in other directions
and, except for the publicatioll of two studies on the
subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies,
nothing further was done until by the generosity of tlie
Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity
of publication was offered. In its present forin the worlt
h a s been largely rewritten and revised. I t makes no
claim to present a complete lGstorical account of the
Arabs in Central Asia, but is intended solely as a critical
study of the authorities in greater detail than has hitherto
been made. Much is therefore omitted bccaosc it bas
already been dealt with in the standard histories. In
order to keep down the cost of publication, the extensive
references which originally accompanicd tlie text have
been cut down to a few notes at the end of each chapter.
N o references are given when, as in the great majority
of cases, the authority for thc statements made can
easily be found in the appropriate place either in Tabari
or Balzdhuri.
I regret that several worlcs which are indispensable
for a thorough study of the subject have, for linguistic
reasons, been inaccessible to me. Such are van Vloten's
Opkomst der Abbnsiden, and almost the whole
range of Russian research work. Through the kindness
of Sir Denison Ross, however, I have been able to avail
myself of a draft MS. translation of the most i m p o r t a t
and valuable of them all, Professor W. Barthold's
YI/
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Tuvkestalz, as well as of his as yet unpublislled London
lectures on " T h e Nomads of Central Asia." My sincere
thanks are due to Sir Denison Ross also for his continued
interest and inaterial assistance ever since he first introduced me t o t h e subject ; to Sir Thomas Arnold for much
encouragement and helpful counsel ; to Professor
Barthold, who h a s read the MS. through and made a
number of valuable suggestions ; to the Trustees of the
Forlong Bequest Fund for their ltindness in undertalting
t h e publication ; and in no small nieasure to my wife,
who has given much time and labour to preparing t h e
MS. for publication.
London,
April, 1923.
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THE OXUS BASIN

Early History.
The Oxus is a boundary of tradition rather than of
history. Lying midway between the old frontier of
Aryan civilisation formed by the Jaxartes and the Pamir
and the natural strategic Irontier offered by t h e northeastern escarpment of the plateau of k i n , it has never
proved a barrier to imperial armies froin either side.
It was not on the Oxus but on the Jaxartes that
Alexander's strategic insight ,fixed the position of
Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian
dominion were thrust back by the constant pressure of
the Central Asian hordes, their retreatwas stayed not on
the Oxus but on the MurghBb. Thus when t h e tide of
conquest turned and the Arabs won back her ancient
heritage for Persia, they, like Alexander, were compelled
to carry their arms ever further to the East and all unknowing re-establish the frontiers of the Achaemenid
Empire. I t was from the legends of S%s%niantimes,
enshrined in the pagee of the historians and the national
epic of Firdawsi, that the Oxus came to be regardcd a s
the boundary between hiin and T i i r h .
Through all the centuries of invasion, however, t h e
peoples of Sogdiana and the Oxus basin remained Irania~l
a t bottom, preserving an Iranian speech and Iranian
institutions. But the political conditions of the country
a t the period of the Arab conquests were so co~nplexthat
it is necessary to trace briefly the course of their
devclopmen t.
The second century B.C,was a period of upheaval in
Central Asia : the powerful Hiung-Nu peoples were
dispossessing weaker tribes of their pasture lands and
forcing them to migate westwards, Between 150 and
B
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126 B.C. a succession of nomadic tribes, the last and
lnost powerful of which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi,
were driven down into Sogdiana. I t is now generally
held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the
question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty.
Before long, however, a second group, the Ic'ang, possessed themselves of Sogdiana, driving the Yueh Chi on
into Bactria and the Afghan mouniains (1). In these
districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a
settledpopulationof Tulthari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already
noted in the Chinese annals for their commercial enterprise (2), and tvhile a t iirst the nomad tribes introduced
complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly
absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and
thus assimilated the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria.
From this fusion arose, about 60 A . D . , the powerful
Icushan Empire which spread into India on the one side
and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over
the Ic'ang ltindgoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under
the new empire, Buddhism was acclimatised in Turltestan,
and Sogdiana developed into a great entrepdt for Chinese
trade with the West. Towards the close of the ihircl
centu~ythe Icushan Empire, wealcelled by attaclts from
the new national dynasties in India and Persia, reverted
to its primitive form of small independent principalities,
which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent
a Persian reconquest, I t is practically certain that
SBsBnian authority never extended beyond Balk11 and
rarely as far. In the fourth and fifth centuries references
are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the north-easi,
the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars) (3), but it does not
appear that any new settlements were made in the
Oxus countries.
In the middle of the fifth century, another people,
the Ephthalites (Arabic Haytal, Chinese Ye-Tha), perhaps a branch of t h e Hiung-nu, not only completely
overran the former Kushan territories, but by successive
defeats of the Persian arinics forced the SZsBnid Icings
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to pay tribute. The Ephthalites appear to have been a
nomadic people organised as a military caste of the
familiar Turkish type, smd the existing institutions and
principalities, in large part a t least, continued side b y side
with them (4). Their rule was too transitory t o produce
any lasting eTIects, or to inflict any serious injury on the
commerce ant1 prosperity of Sogdiaila.
The rise of the Central Asian empire of the Turlrs
proper (Tu-ICueh) dates from their overthrow of the JuanJuan in IlIongolia in 552, under their great Khan, Mokan.
His brother Istami (the Silzibul of the Byzantine
historians), tlie semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribes
of Western Turlts, after co~~solidating
his power in t h e
Ili and Chu valleys, formed an alliauce with KhusrG
AnGshiruCin, and in a joint attack between 563 and 568
the two powers colnpletely overthrew the Ephthalite
kingdom and divided their territorics. For a brief
moment the Oxus was the actual boundary between
friin and TBrBn ; under pressure from the silk traders
of Sogdiana, howwcr, the alliance was brolten and the
wealter successors of AntishirwBn could scarcely do more
than maintain their outpost garrisons on the MurghZb.
From this time the Ephthalites, lilte tlle Kushans, were
gradually assimilating to the Iranian populatioll (5),
though the change was less rapid in the Cisoxine lands of
Lower TukllQristBn,BBdghis, and Herit, where Ephthalite
principalities were re-constituted, probably with Turlrish
support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on
lier north-eastern frontiers (6). 011the other hand the
Turlts of the five western tribes (Nu-she-pi), who became
independent d t c r the break up of the Great Khanate
about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogcliana
and the middle Oxus basin by freqnenl expeditions, in
one case at least as far as Ball<ll. There is no trace in our
records of extensive Turltisli immigration into the
conquered lands ; at most, small groups of Turks
wanderecl south with their herds, eqecidly, it would
seem, south of the Iron Gate (7). I11 general, Turkish
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interference in tlle administration cf the subject principalities was a t first limited to tlie appointment of military
governors ancl the collectio~lof tribute. Thus, in t l ~ e
semi-legendary account give11 by An-NaysBbfiri of tlie
Turkish conquest of BulchLra the Bulch?ir I<hudLl~is
represented as the cliief dihqan under the Turlcish
governor. It is possible also that the native princes
maintained guards of Turlcish mercenaries.
At this period, therefore, so far from the Oxus
being a barrier, there was consicleral~leintercommunication between the peoples on either side, and at least tlie
elements of a racial and cultural unity, in spite of political
divisions. This is a factor of importance in the history
of the Arab conquests : the conquest of Transoxania is
intimately linked with the fortunes of Lower TulchBristiin, and only becainc possible when the latter country
was completely subdued. On tlie other hand, the
Jaxartes formecl a natural racial and political frontier.
" Sllash and Sughd have seldom run together " says
Vambery, and in spite of nominal annexations on more
than one occasion Muslim rule was not effectively
imposed on ShBs11 and FarghCna until some time after
the final conquest of Transoxania. Their chief importance for the history of Transoxania is that they
formed the ju~nping-off place for counter-invasions
from the East. It is not without significance that of the
two battles which were decisive in establishing Arab rule
in Sogdiana one was fought to the west of Balkh ancl the
other on the Talas river, far into the Turlcish lands
beyond the Jaxartes (see pp. 84 and 96).

Political Divisions,
Researches into Chinese records have now made it
possible to obtain a more definite idea of the political
conditions of these frontier provillces in the sevel~tlth
century. All the principalities aclcnowledged the Khan
of the Western Turlcs as overlord and paid tribute to
him ullder compulsion, though, as will appear, there is
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g o o d cause for doubting whether a Turlcisli army ever
c a m e in response to their appeals for support until the
rise of the Tiirgesh power in 716.
Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and
s o ~ z t h - w e s tof the middle Jaxartes are diviclecl by the
I-Iissar mountains into two well-defined areas. The
n o r t h e r n area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshdl
a n d the lesser streams which descend the northern slope
of t h e watershed, the southern comprises the broad
basin forined by the Oxus ancl its tributaries between
t h e mountains of the Pamir and the steppelands. Tlle
f o r m e r ; which as a whole is called Sogdiana in clist i n c t i o n from the smaller principality of Sughd, was a t
t h i s period divided between a number of small states,
each inclependenl of the others but forming together a
l o o s e confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of
t h e I-Iellenic city-states. T h e strongest bond of union
w a s formed by their mutual interest in the Chinese sillc
t r a d e , the chief stations of which were a t Samarqand,
P a y k a n d , and I<ish. The preinier city was Samarqand,
the pre-eminence of which and high culture of whose
population is voucllecl for by Yuan-Chwang. Special
emphasis is laid on their enterprise and success in trade,
a n d a number of early embassies, doubtless commercial
nlissions, are recorded from Samarqand and BulthZrS
t o the Chinese court. The merchant families of Payk a i l d , according to Tomascl~elc'srendering of Narshalchi
(S), were I<usllans, but Iranian elements, reinforced by
emigrants from the SZsZnid dominions, formed the
m a j o r i t y in the cities. The agricultural population was
a l m c s t if not entirely Iranian.
A second link between the majority of the cities was
formecl by the ruling house of the Shao-wu, if, as the
Chinese records assert, these all belonged to one royal
f a ~ n i l y . The head of the clan governed Samarqand and
w a s allied by marriage to the Turlcish I<han ; cadet
branches ruled in Ushrtisana, I<ish, BukhZrB, ancl the
l e s s e r principalities in the basin of the ZarafshSn. In
TIIE
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the later lists the rulers of Sl~%sh
and FarghLna as well as
the I-Chwiirizm ShZlx are shown as belonging lo the clan
also, though with less probability (9). Whether the
family were of IC'ang origin, or, as the Chinese records
state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in the
Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (KlludZh,
S h ~ h , a n dthe general term diliq2n). Some of the princes
also possessed Turlcish titles, probably conferred on them
as vassals of the Khan. The ruler of Samarqand, as
king of Sughd, is called the Ikhshidh or IkhshEdh, which
is easily recognised as the Persian khshayathiya. This
title was borne also, as is well known, by the king of
FarghZna. It is certain at least from both Chinese and
Arabic accounts that these rulers were not Turks. The
Turkish names by which they are sometimes called %'ere
given out of deference or compliment to their Turkish
suzerains, just as Arabic names begin to appear amoilgst
them immediately after , the Arab conquests. Particdarly misleading is the name Tarkhan which appears
inore than once in tlie list of princes of Samarqand and
has been erroneously talcen as the title Tarkhgn; though
it is in reality only the Arabic transcription of a personal
name spelt in the Chinese records Tu-hoen. During
the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these
princes had become fully identified with their Iranian
subjects (10). Tile " kingship " moreover was not a
real monarchy but rather the primacy in an oligarchical
system. Their authority was far from absolute, and tlie
lancled aristocracy (dihqgns) and rich merchants possessed, as will be seen later, not only a large measure of
independence but also on occasion the power to depose
the ruling prince and elect his successor. As t h e
succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is
probable that, according to Iranian custom, eligibility
was confined to a single royal house. I n some cases,
it would seem, the succession was regulated during t h e
lifetime of the reigning prince by sonle such inethod a s
association in the principate, probably colnbined wit11

the appoint~nent of t h e reinaini~lg pri~ices to other
fiefs (111.
T h e " codederacy " of these states, however, \\,as ill
n o sense all alliance arid probably anlounted to little
Illore than a anodzls vivendi. Besides the inore iulI>orta.1lt
princes there existed an enormous nuinber of petty
autocrats, some possibly Turlcish, others probal)ly
descended from former conquerors, wliose authority
m a y sorneti~nes have scarcely extended beyo~ld the
limits of their own villages. In lands subject to tlie TurBs
a n d patrolled by nomadic tribes an effective centraliscd
government was hardly possible. Mutual antagonis~lls
a n d wars cannot have bee11 uncoiilinon though we have
now no record of them, except that during the early Arab
period there was hostility between Bulthsrs and Ward%~~a,
b u t the latter cannot be reckoned among the Shao-wu
principalities since, according to Narsliakhi, it was
founded by a S%s%nidprince about 300 a.n. Until thc
profitable Chinese tracle was threatened by the Arabs
we find no trustworthy record of combined resistailce
offered by the country to its piecemeal reduction, and
only long after the conquests of Qutayba is tliere any
hint of a concerted rising. At the same time, the
strength of the cities and warlike nature of their
inhabitants may be gauged from the way in which thcy
n o t only preserved themselves from destruction at the
hands of their successive nomad invaders, but even
gained their respect, while this, in some respects perhaps
t h e most highly civilised of all the lands subdued by the
Arabs (12),proved also the most difficult to conquer,
a n d most intractable t o hold.
The same lack of unity is apparent in the districts
south of the Iron Gate, though nominally subject to a
sillgle authority. I t is important to bear in mind that
t h e ZarafshXn and Oxus valleys were completely independent of olle another-that the differencebetween tthem
was not merely one of government, but also of Ianguage,
alld even, to some extent, of blood, owing to the greater
\
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Illixtllre of races in the southern basin.
Whell,
occusiollally,as in the " Miis&legend ", reference is made
ill tllc Arabic l~istoriesto colnmon action b y SuglldanJ
y ~ u k ~ l ~ i s it
t ~isl l ,due t o s complete misunderstanding
of tilc
of the country prior to the conquest, and it is
\vortlly of
illat no such reference is t o be found in
ally rlarrative otllerwise reliable. On his outward
jollrllcy ill 630, Yua11 Chwang found t h e country divided
into t\vcnty-sc\len petty states under separate rulers,
with tile cllicf military authority vested in the Turkisl1
Sltiid, tile eldest son of the Jabghu of t h e Western Turlcs,
wllo lind ids scat near the modern Qunduz. During the
1)cl.iotl of ani~rchy\vliich befell the Western Turks in t h e
lo\ln\\*i~ig
years, the whole district was formed into a n
indcl~endcntkingdon1 under a sol1 of the former S h ~ d ,
wllo lo~intlcdthe dynasty of Jabglms of Xulth~rist3n.
blir~orTurkisl~ chiefs and intendants probably seized
similar authority in their own districts, a n d though
tlur Jal)gliu was rccognised as suzerain of all t h e lands
lrorn the Irou Gate to Ziibulistzn and Kapisa a n d from
IIerZt to I<liuttal (13), his authority was littIe more t h a n
11onlinnl except within his immediate district of Upper
I'uklrarislan. The lesser princes, in Shiimsn, Khuttal,
kc., illany of wholn were Tu~;ltisll,appear t o h a v e acted
fluitc intlep~iidentl~
and did not hesitate t o defy their
suzerain on occasion. Tlle name TukhSristSn is used
vl-rY loosclp in the Arabic records, with misleading
rffect (14). 1.10~relatively unimportant t o t h e Arabs
I'ultharistsll proper was is sllown b y the fact t h a t i t s
rrlcxatioll (see ~ C ~ O I1).V 38) is passed over in silence.
I"lc
of
resistance offered t o t h e early A r a b
conr~uesLs
was borne by the princes of Lower Xukhgr?'an- i.6.8 tile riverain districts south of the Iron Gate,
"lcludq
Chagll~nbin and Balkll, together with t h e
@)hihalite~rincil)alitiesill Jfizj*, ~ z d ~ hand
i ~ ,
Wib1y tlle mOU11tainous fringe of Gharj i s t ~ l l ,
'Ibir
wily the Arabs always regarded Ball&,
'he 'Id rdigious apital of the ~ < u ~~~i~~
~ l ~and~ site
~ ~
8
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of the famous Buddhist shrine of Nawbahiir, as the
capital of the " Turlcs " ; it was in fact: the centre of what
we might allnost tenn the " anlphictyony " of Lower
TukhZristLn, comnbining strategic and colnmercial
importance with religious veneration. Long aftel. the
Nawbahgr had been destroyed by Ibn 'Amir this s a ~ t i ment continued to exist in the country (16).
A chance narrative in Tabari (11. 1224 f . ) , which,
though ol BBtiilite origin, can scarcely have been invented,
indicates the situation in Lower Tulchitristjn in 710.
In the presence of Qutayba, the ShSd and as-Sabal
(King of Ichuttal) do homage to the Jabghu, the former
excusing himself on the ground that though he has joined
Qutayba against the Jabghu, yet he is the Jabghu's
vassal. The Ephthalite prince of Badghis thcn docs
homage to the Shad, who must consequently be regarded
. indentias the chief prince in Lower T u k h ~ r i s t ~ n His
ficatioll with the Jabgbu himself in another passage
(Tab. 11. 1206. 9) is obviously impossible. Though
certainty on the point is hardly t o be expected, the
description best suits the king of Chaghjnizn (Chaghan
Khudah), who consistently adopted a n attitude of cooperation with the Arabs. I t wordd seem too that the
lcing of Chaghanizn commanded the armies of Lower
Tukhkristgn in 652 and again in 737. Moreover, an
embassy to China on bchalf of TulchhBristZn in 719 was
actually despatched by the king of ChaghBniHn, which
implies that he held a status in the kingdom conso~lant
with the high title of Shad. The concl~~siorl
drawn by
Marquart and Chavannes that the lcing of ChaghaniZn
and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the
Chinese records (16).
Such conditio~lsof political disunion were naturally
all in favour of the. Arabs. It might have seemed also
that the general insecurity, together with the burden
ol maintaining armies and courts and the ever-recurring
ravages of invasion, would move the rnass of the population to welcome the prospect of a strong and united

,
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government, more especially as so large a proporti011 of
the Muslin1 armies were composed of tlieir Persian lcin.
For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two
inlportant points. By tlieir use of the word " Turk"
' for all the non-Persian peoples ol the East, they give the
impression (due perhaps to tlie circumstances of the time
in wliicli the chief histories were composed) that the
opponents of the Arabs inTransoxania were the historical
Turlts. The truth is that until 720 the Arab invaders
were resisted only
" b v the local princes with armies
composecl almost entirely of ~ranli'ans,except perhaps
on one or two special occasions when Turlcish forces may
have intervened. The other error is in interpreting the
conquests as primarily wars for the Faith. Rebellion,
for instance, is expressed in terms of apostasy. I t is now
well established that this conception is exaggerated ;
religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much
later ,and even then chiefly as expressions of political
relationslips. To the Iranian peasantry, themselves
steadfastly attached to the national cults, the advent of
another faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures
and religions of Asia a t first carried little significance.
Two factors in particular combined to provoke a resistance so stubborn that it took the Arabs a century
merely to reduce the country to sullen submission. The
first of these was the proud national spirit of the
Iranians which was eventually to break down the
supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to the first
Persian dynasties in IslBm. The few wise governors of
IChurBsb found in this their strongest support, but,
outraged again and again b y an arrogant and rapacious
administration, the subject peoples became embittered
and sought all means of escape from its tyranny. The
secoild was the interest of the commercial relations on
which the wealth and prosperity of the country depended. This again might have disposed the cities to
accept a rule which proinised not oilly stability, but a
wide extension of opportunity. The Arab governors,

-
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as we shall see, were 11ot indeed blind to tlds, but the
exactiolls of the treasury, and still more the greed of local
officials, combined with t h e uilsettlemel~t of col~stant
invasion t o create an attitude of distrust, which deepened
later into despair. I t must not be forgottal t l ~ a tthe
commercial ties of the Sogdians werc much stronger with
the East than wit11 the West, and that this too prompted
them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese
rather than with t h e Arabs when the necessity of lnaking
a choice was forced upon tllein.

The Arabic Sources.
The early Arabic sources are remarlcably rich in
material for the reconstruction of the conquests in
Kllurissn and Transoxania. For the earlier period the
narratives of Ya'qfibi and Baladhuri are nearly as full
as those of Tabari, but the special value of the latter lies
jn his method of compilatiol~wllicl~renders the traditious
amenable to critical study and thus provides a control
for all the othe~s. Mo~eover,while the other historians,
regarding the conquests of Qutayba as definitely coinpleting the reduction of Transoxania, provide only meagre
notices for the later period, Tabari more than cornpensates for their silence by the uloimous wealth of detail
embodied in t h e accounts he quotcs from Al-Madg'iili
and others of t h e last thirty years of Uinayyad rule.
As a general rule, these three historians rely on different
authorities, tl~oughall use the earlier histories of AlMadB'ini and AbB 'Ubayda to some extent. The monograph of Narshakhi (d. 969 A.D.) based on both Arabic
and local sources, with sonle resemblance to Baliidhuri,
i s mlIortunately preserved only in a Persian version of
two centuries later which has obviously been edited, t o
what extent is unlcno\vn, but which probably represents
the original as unsatisfactorily as Bal'arni's Persian
version of Tabari. Even so it preserves to u s some
account of the peoples against whom the Arab invaders were matched, and thus does a little to remedy
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the tlelects of the other historians in this respect. I t
may well be doubted, however, wlietlier some of its
narratives' merit the reliance placed upon them b y van
Vloteri (17). Thc inucli later historian Ibrl al-Athir introduces very littlc new material, but confines himself for
thc most part to abridgiug and re-editing the narratives
in Tabari, witli a tendency to follow the Inore exaggeralctl
accounts. The geographer Ibn IChfirdXdhbih gives a
list of titles ancl names, which is, however, too confused
to supply any reliable evidence.
Reference has already been made to certain aspects of
tlie conquests in which the Arab historians are misleading.
Their information on the Turlcs and the principalities of
Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be supplemented ancl par LS
of their narratives controlled from Chinese sources,
chiefly througl~ Chavannes' valuable " Documents snr
les Tou-ICiue (Turcs) Occidentaux." But there are two
other facts u~hichalso detnand attention : one, t h a t tile
Arabic authorities, as ive possess them, and even witli all
allowance made for their limitations, are by no means
exhaustive ; i . ~ .reliance
,
011 on~issionsin the narratives
is a n unsafe principle o
f criticisnl : the other, t h a t by
critical study it is possiblc to distinguish at certain poinls
scveral lines of tendentious tradition or legend, directed
to the interests of national feeling or of some pa~ticular
tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round
specific persons. 'I'hcse may most conveniently bc
sum~nariseda s follotvs :
1 . A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of
Ibn KltZzim :
2. An Azd-Rabi'a tradition, centred on Muhallab
and hostile to Hajjaj. This became the most
popular traclition among the Arabs, and is
followcd by Baladhuri, b u t opposed by Ya'qitbi :
3 . A Bshilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero,
Qutayba b. hluslirn. I n general it found littlc
favour but is occasioilally quoted solnewhat
sarcastically by Tabari.

4. A local BukhhB tradition, Iollowed by Ya'qCbi,
BalBdhuri and Narshalhi. I t presents t h e
early conquests under the forin of an historical
romance, centred on the Queen IChXtliu in the
part of a national Boadicea. Other local
traditions, which are frequently utilised by
Tabari, seein to be much more free from serious
exaggeration :
5. The few ilotices in Dinawari follow a11 e n t i r e l ~
divergent and extreiljely garbled traclition from
unknown soul.ccs, which inay for the most
part be neglected :
6. The quotations inade by Baladhuri (e.g, 422. 10)
from Abli 'Ubayda show the u~fluenccof a rewriting of episodes with an anti-Arab bias,
directed to the interests of the Shu'fibiya movement, in which Ab13 'Ubavcla was a prominent
figure (18).
7 . In the later period, there appears also the fraginents of a t;adition of w h i 8 Nasr b. SayyLr is
the hero.
Some, if not all, of these Lraditions developedin some
detail, and where they are not balanced by other versions
they present a distorted narrative of events, verging in
some cases on the fictitious. The most noteworthy
examples of this are the IChXtCn lcgcnd (see below 11. 18)
and the typical story of the exploits of MCs3. b. IChLzim
in Transoxania in a style not unworthy of Bedouin
romance (19). I t is therefore most important to disentangle these variant traditions ancl assign i t proper
value to each. The BXhilite accounts of Qutayba's
conquests, for instance, contain wild exaggerations of
fact, which, nevertheless, have sometimes been utilised
in all seriousness by modern historians, amonst other
purposes to establish synchronisms with the Turkisl~
inscriptions (SO).
With these precautions, it is possible to follow up and
reconstruct, with comparative certainty and completeness,
A

that progress of the Arab arms in Central Asia whose
vicissitudes are o u t l i i l e d in the following pages.
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11. T H E EARLY RAIDS
The Conquest of Lower TztkkBristBqz.
Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces, pursuing
Yazdigird from thc field of Nihxwand in 211642, 1lad
already come in contact with the " Turks " of Tulth%ri s t ~ nbefore the death of 'Omar. But ille final
destruction of the S%%nidpower and iirst iml>osition of
Arab rule on KhurBs%nonly followed ten years later, by
tlie troops of 'Abdullah ibn 'Arnir, 'OthmCn's goverlior
in Basra. The Ephthalites of HerM and Badghis submitted without a blow, and the first serious check to
their advance was met in the Murghlb valley, when alAhnaf b. Qays with an army of 4,000 Arabs and 1,000
Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces
of Lower Tukharistan and was compelled to retire on
Merv-Rfidh. A second expedition under al-Aqra' b.
Hlbis, however, defeated a weaker force in Jiizjw, and
subsequently occupied Jfizjgn, F2ry%b, Txlaq%~i,and
Balkh. Small divisions made plundering raids into the
neighbouring territories, e.g., to SiminjBn (a town within
tlle frontiers of TukhaistBn proper, governed by a
not
Turkish prince, the Ru'b IChSn), and to ICllw%~izin,
always with success ; on the other hand, a successful
raid was made on MByamurgli in Sogdiana in 331654,
which is mentioned by Abi~'Ubayda alone of the Arabic
authorities (1). A general insurrection which broke
out sliortly afterwards, headed by a certain Qarin,
apparently a member of the noble Persian family bearing
that name, seems t o have been instrumental in causing
the Arabs to evacuate KhurlsZn for a time (2), though
several raids are recorded of 'Ali's governors between
36 and 38 A.H. These earliest " conquests," in fact, were
little more than plundering raids on a large scale, the
effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum
was carryillg forward the Arabs irresistibly. According
I6

to t h e Cliiuese records, which, however, require to be
used wit11 cantion at this point, the retreat of the Arabs
in 655 was iollo\ved up by the army of Tulth?iristgn who
reinstated PerGz, the son of Yazdigird,
- as titular lting- of
Persia (3).
When i~eacewas restored to IslZn~by the recognition
of ~u'B\vfi,ain 41/661, Ibn 'Amir was again entrusted
wit11 t h e conquest of IChurBsBn. The same rough and
ready metliods were adopted as before ; there appears
to have been no definite plan of invasion, and even the
order of governors is tnlcertaiil. Not only are traditions
relating to A.H. 32 and 42 confused by the different
autliorities, but a vast anlount of the whole is affected
by tribal legends. Hints of fierce resistance are given
from time to time. Qays b, al-Haytham, the governor's
first legate, was faced with a fresh revolt ill Bgdghis,
IIerBt, and Balltll. He recaptured the latter and in retaliation destroyecl the famous shrine of Nawbahxr, but
left t h e Eplilhalites to be dealt with by his successor,
'Abdullah ibn 1ChB~in1. It is clear that there was n o
ordered progress of the Arab arms until IihurZs%n \was
brought under the administration of ZiyZd b. Abihi.
After a n experimental division of the province under
tribal leaders, a policy obviously dangerous and quicltly
abancloned, ZiyZcl, realising the danger of allowing
Persia11 ilationalism a iree liand in the East, baclted up
by the resources of TulthSristZn, centralised the administration a t Merv, and organised a preventive campaign.
I n 47/067 11is lieutenant, al-Haltam b. 'Amr al-GhifZri,
opened a series of campaigns directed to the conquest
of Lower TulthZrist%n and Gharjistgn, in the course of
wliich lle crossed the Oxus and carried his arms into
Cl~agl~ZniZu,
and drove PEr6z back to China in discomfiture. On his death, three years later, the conquered
provinces rose in revolt, but the new governor, Rabi'
b. i
d 1 H i t l i tlie first conqueror of Sijistzn,
after reducing Balltll, pursued the Ephthalite army into
QuhistZn and dispersed it with great slaughter. Again
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an expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chagllz,li~n
(clearly indicating the connection between C h a g l t g ~ l i ~ ~ ~
and Lower TukhgristZn), while another directed down tile
left b a n k of the river secured Zamm and Amul, the two
chief ferry points for Sogdiana. Mention is also made of
a conquest of IShwiirizm. All these expeditioils seem
t o point to a methodical plan of conquest, arranged
betweell ZiyLcl and his governors ; tlie Arab po\ver was
thus firnlly established, for the moinent at least, in tlle
Cisoxanian lands, and the way preparcd for Uie invasion
of Sogdiana. A further important step was the colonisation cd ICharLs3n by fifty thousand families froin Basra
and Kfifa (4),settled according to Arab practice in five
garrison towns, for the double purpose of securi~igthe
conquests already made, a n d providing the forces for their
further extension.
The First I?zvasioiz of BztlrhZrZ nqtd Sz6gh.d.
Although at this junctioil ZiyLd himself died, liis
policy was carried on b y his sons, in particular by
'UbaydullBh. Scarcely a n y governor, not even Hajjaj,
has suffered so much at t h e hands of the traditionists as
the " Murderer of Husayn," though his ability and
devotion to the Urnaygads are beyond questio~~.
I t is not
surprising therefore t h a t his earlier military successes
should be so briefly related, in spite of their importance.
Yet as he was no 111ore than 25 years of age wlien
appointed b y Mu'Bwiya t o the province of IchurBiin on
probation, and only t w o years later wasselected to fill
his father's position in 'Iraq, his administration must have
been marltedly successful. The policy of Ziy5d had now
firmly secured Khurhsiin and made it feasible to use i t as
a base for the extensioil of the conquests into the rich
lands across the river. O n his arrival at Merv, therefore,
in the autmnn of 531673, the new governor began Prcparations for an invasion of Bulchaii.
T h e Shao-wu principality 01 Bulchara was at this time
second in importance o n l y to Sanarqand. I t illcluded
C
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not only the greater part of the oasis (" al-Bulh8riya ")
then tnuch more thicltly populated than now, but also the
great elnporiuln of Paylcand, which controlled the trade
roote across the Oxus at Amnl. Of its early history we
have ~ \ V Oaccounts, both confused, inaccurate in detail,
and often conflicting. From these it ]nay be gatherecl
that the prince, who held the high Turltish title of Shad
(5),resided at Paylcand,the citadel ol BiikhBr?ibeing eitlier
loui~detlor rcstored by the BulchBr I<hucl?ihBidfin, probably
in consequence of the Arab invasions. This prince at his
cleat11 left a son oiily a few months old on whose behalf
t l ~ eregency was exercised by the Queen-Mother. This
lxinccss, Bnowl under the title of' Rh?itim (a Turlcish
for111of the Sogdian word for " lady ") became the central
figure in the local traditions, which represent the Arab
invasions as occurring precisely d u ~ i n gthe period of her
regency. This version is the one accepted b y Baliidhuri,
Ya'qfibi, and Narshalchi, but thougl~ not altogether
devoid of historical value, it is certainly. misplaced, and
the trne acconnt of tlle early conquests must, for cogent
reasons, be sought in the brief and widely divergent
narratives of Tabari. In the first place the KhEtiinlcgencl, like all such legends, has grown by natural
cla~borationof detail, as in the account given by Narshalchi
ol IChiitiin's administration of justice and by continual
accretions Iron1 othcr streams of traclition, as seen, on
conlparii~gtlle narratives of Balgdhuri and Narshakhi,
in tlie introclllction of episodes of Ibn Khgzim and Mullallab. Critical examination also reveals alternative
traditions and cl~ronological inconsistencies, as, . for
cxalnple, the birth of Tughshgda after the illvasioll of
%'id 1). 'Otllln?in, I<hZtfin's reign of 16 years, and others
mentioned below. There is clear evidence of the late
com~ilationof tile tradition in the frequent refere~lcest o
" Tarkllim, king of Sughd," though his reign did not begin
until considerably after 606 (6). It may be noticed t h a t
in
varhnt account of the conquests prefixed t o t h e
Persian edition of Narsl~akhi and ascribed to A,,-
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NaysXbfiri t h e r e is no reference at all-to KhBtiin. Moreover there a r e indications that Tabari was aware of the
local tradition and completely rejected it ; this, a t least,
would account o r the unusual practice of specifying
Qabaj-IChStfin as " the wife of thc lcing " in 54 n.a.
Even Balldhuri rejects the Inore fantastic developments
of the legenrl. Tabari's narrativcs, however, require to
be collated with the additioilal material in Balldhuri,
who hasno t relied entil-ely on thc local tradition. The germ
of the native version is probably to be found in a confusion of the Arab conquests with the later war between
BulthBrl a n d Wardana (7), whose echoes are heard in
Qutayba's iiivasions thirty years after.
I n the spring of 641874 'Ubaydulld~b. ZiyLd crossed
the river aild marched directly on Paylcald. After a
partial success, he led his forces forward towards Bukhlra
and severely defeated the army of the Bulrhar JChudXh.
From Tabari's narrative, which relates only that two
thousand m e n of Bulchiirl, slcilful archers, were talten by
'Ubaydullah to Basra, where they formed his personal
guard, it i s left t o bc inferred that a treaty was concluded
under which the Bulthjr IChudZh became tributary. The
local~traditionmagnifies the expedition by adding a siege
of Bulth8rH (during the winter) and bringing in an army
of Turlcs t o assist KhXtCn, but confirms the success of
the Arabs. 'Ubaydullah's practice on this occasion of
lorrning a bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to
liave been a common one. 'Abdur-Rakman ibn Samura
hacl previously brought captives from Sijisth to Basra,
where t h e y built him a mosque, and later governors of
I<hurBs~ncontinued the practice, as will be seen. In
this may b e recognised perhaps the germ of the Turkish
guards recruited b y the later 'Abbasid Caliphs.
fUbaydullall's successor, Aslaln 11. Zur'a, remained
inactive, but in 561676 Sa'id b. 'Othmzn, who had obtained
tile governorship of I < h u r % b by importuning
MuiXwiyn, cariied the Arab arms more deeply into Transoxania, defeated the Suglldians in the open field and
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reduced their city. Talcing fifty young nobles as hostages,
he retired from Sughd and subsequently occupied
Tinnidh, a11 important fortress on the Oxus colltrollillg
tile maill North and South trade route, having presull~ablyn~archedthrough the Iron Gatc. Thc conquest
of Sughd was thus definitely co-ordinated'with t h a t of
Cllagli6ni%nn.T%barilsnarrative is strangely vague and
abrupt ; it contains no mention of BulchBrR nor any
tleh~iitereierence to Sa~narqand,except for the statement
Ilkat it was the objective of Sa'id's expedition. Using
this narrative alone, one ~vouldbe inclined to suspect
that the city captured by Sa'id was not Samarqand but
I<isIl (sincc it has been established by Marquart that
ICisl~was fonnerly called Sughd), and that the reference
lo Sam:\rqand was due lo a later misunderstanding of
t l ~ cname (8). On the other hancl, both the local
tradition and Abii 'Ul~aydaspeak of a siege of Samarqand
by Sa'id, tlloug11 their narratives are far from being in
:~greementin detail, and there are other indications of
coilfusion between Sa'icl and Salrn b. ZiyBd. All accounts
except Narsl~altlii's, however, agree that the hostages
NIIO were carried by Sa'id to Madina and there murdered
I~imwcre Sughdians (g). BalZdhuri's tradition of Sa'id's
expedition is as follows. On his crossillg the river,
I<hLliln at first renewed lier allegiance, only t o withdraw
it again on the approach of an army of Turlts, Sughdians+
and men of ICisll ant1 Nasaf, 120,000 strong. Sa'id,
ho\~'ever, completely defeated the enemy and after a
triumpllal elltry into Bul&ir~,marched on Samarqand,
his forces swelled by IChBtiin's army, besieged it for three
days
made it tributary. On his return h e captured
Tinnidh and while there received the tribute due from
Iclfitiul alld the allegiance of Khuttal. Narshal&i's
accoullt is
same in essentials, adding only a number of
ir~laginativedetails.
Sa'id was unable to retain his position in I < h u r ~ s ~ n ,
*or five Years the conquests were stayed (except for
Simmer raids) under the indolerlt Aslam b, zLlrZa
and the

20

ARAB

.

iI
i

I

THE EARLY
RAIDS

21

avaricious 'Abdur-Rakm,~n b. ZiyBd. In 61/680-681
Yazid I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyiid, to
IchurBsxn and S i j i s t ~ n . Eager to enlulate his brother,
Sahn, even before leaving Basra, announced his intention
of renewing the expeditions into Transoxania and enlisted
a picked force o n the spot, including such tried leaders as
Muhallab b. Abi Sufra and 'Abdullah b. I<hBzim. From a
poem preserved in the Hamxsa of Abti Tammain (10)
it would appear that somewhat unwilling levies for this
expedition were raised even in l\iIesopotamia. Towards
the close of the winter a surprise attaclc was made on
IChwiirizin, with some success. Tabari gives two versions
of this expedition, the first of which is a highly embroidered one from t h e Muhallabite tradition. During the
same year, Salm marched into Sugl~dand occupied
Samarqand, where he appears to have made his headquarters over t h e winter. BalZdhuri mentions a subsidiary raid on i<hujai~daullder A'shii HanldXn, in which,
however, t h e Muslims w e x defeated, and a Sughdian
revolt which was crushed with the loss of its leader, here
called Bandiin; The name is almost certainly to be read
a s that of the Bukhzr-IChudiih, Bidall (ll),and in view
of t h e silence of Tabari raises rather a difficult problem.
It may bc conjectured that what Baliidhuri intended was
a revolt of t h e Bulchariots, combined with Sughdiail
forces. The origin of this statenlent may pcrhaps be
sought for in t h e Bulch%rZ tradition, which Bal%d~uii
does not follow in his general account of the expeditions
of Saim, but which he may have tried to work in with the
other. On t h e other hand he nowhere refers to Bidfin
as the B u l h z r XhudBh. As related by Narshalchi and
Ya'qBbi Salnl's expedition is directed solely against
BulchBrB. IChBttn, on promising her hand to TarlthEn,
receives a reinforcement of 120,000 rnen from Sughd, and
BTdEn (here still alive) recruits an army in " Turkistxn,"
including the " Prince of Xbotan." After severe fighting,
t h e Muslilll forces, numbering 6,000, l d l Bidfin and rout
unbelievers, taking so much booty that the share of
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cacll llorsenlatl alnounts to 2,400 dirllems. IChstfin,
t~lorollgl,ly~lumblecl by this decisive proof of Arab
illvillcibi]ity, sues for peace and pays a heavy tribute.
~ e y o l l ctile
~ fa1tastic exaggerations and incoherencies of
the legend, there is nothing inherently improbable in a
Bukllm-iot revolt. 111 support of this view, it lnay be
reInnrked tllat the death of Bidfin at this p o i n t woulcl
witll tile sle~~der
data we have for thc internal wars
which proljably formed the original basis of t h e IChBtiinlegelld, ancl would also provide a foothold for t h e later
rlevelopn~e~~ts
of the tradition. Without fuller evidence,
Ilowever, we can get no further than reasonable
conjcctnre.
Aftcr tlie conquests made by Salm, wllich probably
occo~iecltlie years 682 and 683, it seemed as though t h e
Arril)s were on the verge of imposing their rule on
Trnl~sosaninn111encivil war brolce out in the h e a r t of t h e
E~npire. Even allowing for the fact that these expeditions were little more than raids, the comparative ease
~rtitliwliich tile Arabs held to ransom the richest cities
in the country is asto~iisl~ing.The explanation can lie
olllp iu their mutual exclusiveness. There is n o t a hint
of united action in the field in Taba~i'saccounts (12).
A kctor n~11ic11may have exercised some influence was
that Sogdiana was con~pletelyisolated during t h e s e years
and unable to look for support from without. The
power of tlle Western Turks was brolcen by t h e Chinese
armies between 046 and 058 ; Chinese forces a r e said t o
llave reached as far west as ICish, and the Empel-or ICaoTslng had officially annexed all the territories forlllerly
included in the Turkish dominions. In the latter year
tllcprovinces of Sogdiana and the Jaxartes were organize,-in sixteen districts, including a " Govel.nment of Persia "
ullder the PErdz already mentioned, situated apparelltly
in Siiistan, possibly even in Eastern I < l l u r ~ s ~(13).
l~
The immediate practical effect of this change of status
of little moment, bnt her nominal annexation gave
Cllina a prestige which was destined to exercise immerlse

!

!

t

1.

T a s EARLYI ~ A I D S

23

influence in determining the attitudc of the peol>les of
Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 670 to 602, ilowever, the
new power of Tibet held the Chinese armies in cllcclc ill
the Tarim basin and cut off all possibility of Chi~lcse
intervention in the West. Tile Sogdiall princes were
thus throw11 on their own resources, and, @orant as
yet of the danger behind the Arab raids, thev seem to have
bowed. to the storm. It must not be forgbtten that the
cities had never before met such an enemy a s the Arabs.
They had been accustomed to plundering raids by Tnrlcs,
wlio disappeared as quicltly as they came, and who,
dislilting t o undertake a lengthy siege, were easily
appeased b y a ransom. Familiar with such nominal
annexations, [hey would naturally adopt the same tactics
against the new invaders. Had tlie Arabs maintained
their pressure, there was thus every prospect that Transoxania would have bee11 colonised with a tithe of t l ~ e
expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would
liave become as integral a part of ilie Muslirn dominioils
as I<hur3sBn. But the opportunity was lost in the
fratricidal struggles of the factions, and when tlie Arabs
recommenced their encroachments, the deterrnined
resistance offered to their advancc showed that the lessons
of the first invasion had not been lost on the native
princes.

The Witlzdmwal of the Arabs.
The tribal feudswliich occupicd the Arabs of Ichui-Ss3n
left the princes of Transoxmlia free to regain their indep e ~ ~ d e n c e I. t would seem even that Lower Tnldl%ristBn
was not only in part lost to the Arabs but that local
forces took the offensive and raided IChurZs5n. 00nthe
gradual restoration of order under Umayya, however,
Lower TukhSristiin again recognised, a t least in name,
the Arab suzerainty (14). Meanwhile, a strange episode
had occurred in Chagll3niiin. M6~5,the son of 'Abdullah
ibn I(hgzi~n, sent by his father to secure a safe place of
retreat, had captured tlie strong fortress of Tirmidh,
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from whicll lie continually raided the neighbouring
districts. His exploits were worlced up in popular story
illto an epic of adventure, in which legend has almost
overlaicl historical fact. The most fantastic exaggerations were devised in order to provide a suitable background for the incredible dceds of valour indulged in
by the hero. But in truth his actual exploits were
sufficiently anlazing, and all the efforts of the forces of
t h e local rulers (magnified in the legend to huge armies of
" Turks and I-laytal and Tibetans ") although aided
o n one occasion by a force of Khuzg'ites, were unable to
dislodge him. For fifteen years he remailled in secure
possession of his stronghold, a refuge for the disaffected
from all sides, and a standing example of the helplessness
of the ru1el.s across the river.
In 77/006 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into
Transoxania. An expedition to I<hwBrizm was successful
(16),another across the Oxus narrowly escaped destruction. Baliidht~rimentions, with doubtful accuracy, a
successful raid on Khuttal, which may, however, only be a
variant on this. An expedition directed against BulthBrH,
which is said to have had Tirmidh as a secoild objective,
was hurriedly abandoned on the fresh outbreak of revolt
under Boltayr b. WishBh in Khur%s%n, Though the
revolt failed in its immediate object, a m o s t serious
situation had been created. Bnlcayr had endeavoured
t o rally the Persians to his side by promising all converts
remission of I<harBj. The opportunity was undoubtedly
seized by largc n~~mbers,
and the pacification occasioned
solne negotiations between Umayya and ThBbit b. Qutba,
an influential noble who acted as spoltesman for the .
rnawiili of Eastern 1<ht~%%11,
Umayya's reimposition of
ICharBj, however, caused widespread unrest (16) and made
prompt action necessary. 'Abdul-Malilt at once recalled
his hapless ltisman (~1778)and mqde Khur%s& a dependency of 'Iraq under the government of Hajjkj. This
far-sighted govenlor had already dealt. with a desperate
situation of the same sort in 'IrBq and reducecl it to
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outward tranquillity. The same extrenle measures that
had been adopted there were not necessary in I<liurBs%n;
its troubles were sue less to insurgent mawiili than to the
Iactions of Qays. Hajjkj was himself a strong gaysite,
but he was not the man to p u t party before the interests
of the State. The first necessity was to appoint a
governor who could be trusted to rcpress both forms of
anarchy and ill Muhallab soch a man was available. His
tribe of Azd was not yet strong enough in I<hur%sknto
cause the rislt of ope11i11g a new challnel for factional
strife, and his niilita~yreputation fitted him for carrying
out HajjZj's policy of active campaigning as an antidote
to internal dissension. I t is possible that Hajjiij had in
mind from the first a definite conquest of Transoxailia,
but for a few years nothing inore than sporadic raicls toolt
place.
Muhallab's first care, however, was t o encourage the
settlement of Azd in I<hurBsBn, until he was supported
by a division equal in size to any other. After securing
the crossing at Zamm in 80/G99 he marched into the
district of Kish and there established his headquarters
for two years, besieging the city and sending out lnitlor
expeditions undcr his sons in various directions (17).
Yazid was sent with a force into Ichuttal, nominally to
co-operate with a pretender t o the throne, but met with
little success ; Habib, seut against RabinjZn, found himself countered by the iorces ol Bulthiirk. BalBdhuri's
account of Muhallab's campaigns is ludicrously exaggerated ; Tabari quotes Muhallab himself as discouragiug
any attempts at effecting a conquest. On the death of
his son al-Mughira in Raja13 82, he came t o terms with
I<ish and abandoned his expeditions, but died in the
following Dhu'l-Hijja (Jan. 702) near Merv RLidl~,and
was succeeded by his son Yazid.
The Muhallabite tradition which represents the
appointment as distasteful to Ziajjgj but popular in
I<liuriisiin is almost certainly influenced by the later
hostility between Yazid and Hajjaj. It is probable,
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llol\~cl,cc,tllat Hajjzj, whose policy Was to keep
golremors (lcpen(1ent on himself, viewed with suspicioll
tile concclllration of autllority in the hands of the leader
of a llo\\,erful]~ostilcclan, but he was content to wait for
the i ~ ~ e a ~ ~ant1
ti~
give
n r Irazid sufficient rope to hang himself. Esccpt lor a11 attempted raid on RllwLrizm
Yazi(I carried ont no cspeditions, while under his governI I I C I I ~ the precarious internal balance of I<hurZsEn was
sooil upset. Tlie quarrels of Qays had been conlposed by
liluldlab, but they were in no mood to bear wit11 t h e
lcadersl~ip of the parvenu Azd ; already before t h e
dcatll of Mul~allab,in spite of the Tamimite eulogy
quoted by Tabari, there x7as a moment when t h e feud
tl~rcatcnctl to break ont. The pronounced factional
lcauings of Yagid strained the situation still further.
I3vc11 more serious was the attitude of the mawLli.
Hu~.;lytIi,Llir brother of Thiibit ibn Qutba, had been left
brldl~dat ICisl~by Iiluhallab to collect the tribute, b u t on
his rcturn was scoorgccl for disobedience. The disgrace
cut Ilnrayth deeply ; too late Muhallab realised t h e
gravity of llis act, but Hurayth spurned his overtures
and wit11 Tllabit fled to MCsZ a t Tirmidh. Yazid retdiatctl with foolish severity by maltreating their families,
wliicll only illflamed the general resentment. H u r a y t h
and Thsbit uscd their influence to stir up a n insurrection
to act iu co~~cert
with Mfis?i ; the king of ChaghZniZn
ant1 his llplitl~alitecoufeclerates heacled by NEzak, prince
of Bgdgllis, readily responded, while Persian interest was
cscitetl by the return to Tukh~ristZnof the son of PErbz,
tllc heir of Llle SL3.nids. I t seems probablethat even some
of gays mere a party to the scheme (18). Seizing a n
opllortulliiy tvh~nYazid was occupiecl with the rebel
forces of Ibll al-Asllatli on the borders of I(hur&.sjln t h e
rc\'olt broke out. Yazid \\,as powerless to prevent tile
csl)l1lsion of his residents from Chaghgnisn and Lower
T~~kbRristZn,
arid MCisri is said to have refrained froln
in\.:lding ICllurZsZn only fro111 fear that it
fall into
the hallds of '1;hZbit and ffirayth. Even the success
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claimed for Yazid in BBclghis can have beell of little cifcct
(19). Fortunately for thc Arabs, Muss's jealousy of
ThZbit and IIurayth causcd a division ill tllc ranlts of
their enemies, but though the brothers both fell ill battle,
the danger remained acute. The so11 of PEr6z still
lingered in TukharistSn, and even a t
tIlere
was some uneasiness about the situation in Rllurazn (20).
TO Hajjaj i t was obvious that the first. essential was
to reunite the Arabs and that so long as Yazid was in
power that was impossible. The only difficnlty lvns to
find a governor acceptable to Qays and to substitute 11irn
without rislting a revolt of Azd. I t was solved wit11
admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazid to transfer
his authority to his weaker brother Mufaddal, Ilajjsj
a t one stroke removed the man from whom he had most.
t o fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in opposition,
although Yazid realised that the fall of his house ir7as
imminent. At the same time the Caliph's permission
was sought for the nomination of Qutayba ibn h1usli1n
as governor of KhurLsBn. Belonging to the neutral tribe
of B&hila, Qutayba was recboned as allied to Qnys,
b u t might be trusted t o hold the scales evenly between
the factions ; he had already d i s t i n ~ ~ i s h ehimself
d
in
'Ir8q and in his governorship of Rayy, and was the more
devoted to HajjEj in that he was protected by no strong
party of his o m . The accepted belief that HajjZj took
no steps to remove the family of Mui~ailabuntil Mosa was
p u t out of the way is based on a remark attributed to
Muhallab in the &Ifis%-legend.which is frequently contradicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication.
Mufaddal, during his nine monll~sof office in 851704,
seems to have endcavoured to in~prcssHajjaj by a show
of military activity against the rebels in BBdghis. At the
same time, acting in concert with the local princes
(magnified in the legend to " Tarlthiin a ~ l das-Sabal "),
he sent an expedition to Tirmidh under 'OthmAn bb.
~ ~ ~ [ f ~i \df f, iwas
~ g cut off ancl ltilled in a sortie ancl his
S u l a y m ~surrendered at discretion. Ilajjsj's

first exclalnation on hcarillg the ilews is said to have been
one of anger at the insult to Qays, but the last hindrance
to the appoiutme~ltof the new governor was now removecl
and towards the close of the year Qutayba b. Muslim
arrived in M e y v .
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111. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA

THEachievements of the Muslim ar~lliesin Central nsia
during the reign of Walid I wel-e due in the first ,,lace to
the complete co-operation between tlle directive gcnilIsof
Hajjzj and the military capacity of Qutayba. Qutayl,n's
strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, tl,ougll ,
the Arabic texts are at no pains t o conceal the fact tllat
his gifts fell something short of genius. On lnorc tllall
one occasion we are shown in wliat coilstant toucll thc
viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, ;ullci llow
large a part he toolr in drawing up the'plan of campaign,
though the credit of carrying it throng11 to a succcssiul
issue rightly belongs to Qutayba. Iiajjiij seems to 11avc
had the fullest confidence in his lieutenant, ancl if hc did
not hesitate lo utter reproof and waiming when occnsioll
required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of
Qutayba's success. T h e Arabs of all carties sooil rcalisccl
that behind their general lay the authority of HajjHj, ihc
wholesome respect inspired by whom prcventerl a.11~ open
breach during his lifetime. The second factor wl1ic11
materially assisted the conquests was that in tlleic prosccution Qutayba united all parties in I<hurZs%n, l'cl.si;u~s
and Arabs, Qays a n d Yemen. It was no small iuatter to
keep their enthusiasm unabated in the face of campaigns
so protractecl and severe, nor can the entliusiasm bc
explained only b y t h e attraction of a rich booty. It is
b y no means improbable that Qutayba's success was
really due more to his talent for administration than to his
generalship. H e seems t o have realised, a s no other
Arab governor in t h e east had yet done, t h a t in sucll a
province as I<hurHsHn the safety and security of the
Arab government must depend in the long run on the cooperation of the Persian populace, who forlned so great
a majority in the country. The bitterness of f ~ t i o l l a l
29
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strife had sliowii lio~vunsafe it was to rely on the support
of the Arabs alone, especially in the face of such a movement as Yazid had provoked. By his coilciliatory
altitude, therefore, Qutayba earned the conficlence of the
Pcrsiails and repaid it witli conficlence ; from his constant
enlployment of Persian agents and liis growing prefesence for Persian governors, it would seem even t h a t he
came to regard them as forming the " 'Ashira " he laclced
among the Arabs. Although it earned him the ill-will
of the Arabs am1 played a great part in his fall, it m a y b e
that in this he was instrumental in giving the first impulse
to the recoveiy of a national sentiment amongst the
Persians of I<l~urasan.
Tlle situation in Central Asia was also favourable for
a rcnewal of the attempt to annex to the Arab dominions
tlie rich lands of Transoxania, though it is doubtful how
much information the Arabs possessed on this point.
In 682, while Cliina, wealtened internally by the intrigues
of the Empress Wu, hacl her hancls tied by the wars with
Tibet, the Easten1 or Northern Turlrs had re-asserted
their indepencleoce. The new Empire never regained
its authority over all the western territories of the former
IChans, but by constant campaigns hacl extended its rule
over tlie Ten Tribes of the Ili and Chu, who, we are
told, were " almost annihilated." In 701 the Eastern
'Y~lbsinvaded Sogdiana, but there is no reason to assume,
though it has frequently been suggested, that Mul~allab's
forces a t ICisli were affected by this raid. As the necessity
of securing hostages for the safety even of the lines of
co~nn~uiiicatioil
shows, the hostility of the local forces is
suficient to explain all the encounters narrated. The
devastation and loss that invariably accompanied these
raids must have still further wealtened the resources of
the subject princes, to whom there was small consolation
in the appointment of a son of the Khan to command t h e
Ten Tribes. 111 any case the unceasing warfare which
the E a s t e ~ nTurks had to wage against the Tiisgesh
from 699 to 711 eifectnally prevented them from sendulg
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assistance in response t o any appeals for sulpport wllicll
may have reached them from Sogdiana (1).Rqtlally if
not more impossible was it for the Tiirgesh to intervene
in Sogdiana during the same period (2). By the " Turlts,"
as we have seen, the Arab historians mean as a general
rule the local inhabitants, - amongst whom tliere inay
quite possibly have been included a t that time Turkisli
elements. Occasional references t o the 1<118qiin (nnlcss
they may be talcen t o refer t o local chiefs, wllicli is
The
improbable) are obvious falzhr-developments.
narrative of 98 A.H. 011 which the theory of Tiirgesl~
intervention is mainly based, is a pure Biihilite invention.
Finally, the experience 'of the Arabs in later yeam shows
us that, if the resistance of Sogdiana llad been baclted by
large forces oI Turks, it would have been iinpossible for
Qutayba to achieve so large a measure of success.
The conquests of Qutayba fall iiaturally illto iour
periods :
1. 861705 : The recovery of Lower Tult1~;lristiin;
2. From 871706 to 901709 : The conql~cst of
Bukh2rB ;
3. From 91/710 t o 931712 : Consolidation of the
Arab authority in the Oxus valley and its exteilsion
into Sughd;
il.. From 94/713 t o 961716 : Expeditions into thc
Jaxartes provinces.
The recovery of Lower Tukh~Zris/drz.
The first task before Qutayba was t o crush the
revoll ol Lower Tulrh%ristBn. I n the spring of 861705
the army was assembled and marched through Merv
R6dh and T5laqjn on Ballth. According to one of
Tabari's narratives the city was surrenderecl ~vithouta
blow. A second account, which, though not explicitly
givcn as Bshilite, may be regarded as such, since it
centres on Qutayba's brother and is inte~lclecl to
establish a Bxllilite claim on the Barinaltids, speaks of a
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I
revolt alllollgst solne of the inhabitants. This lnay
l,L~,.llal~s
tllc lrlorc correct version, since we hear of
~ ( ; ~ l kbcillg
l ~ ill a l.ui11ous condition four Years later
1 , 0 . 1). Thc submission of Ballch was follo~ved
1
1,). ~ l of ~'rislr,
~ king
~ of
t ChaghZnijll, who h a d ~xobabb'
cclolwr;ltctlwit11 Mufaddal in the attack on Tinnidh t h e
1
\j[ylr llefore. His action was, it seems, inspired b y a feud
I
\Vitl1 tllc liillg of Slliimxn and Althariul, ill the upper
of the Surltllan and Penjab rivers, against
1
l,c llo1)cd to use tlie Arab troops in return f o r h i s assis1:lncc to thcm. Mufaddal had actually projected a n
cs],ctlitio~lagainst SliUln&n before his recall, a n d it was
IIIJ\V c::~rrictlout by Qutayba, who was perhaps t h e Inore
~.rr:itlyto ul~dertakeit since i t assured the safety of t h e
coi~tllernnplxoacli to the Iron Gate. After t h e submissil)n of tllc Icing GllislashtHn, who was of Turkish blood,
:~c.cortlingto Yuan-Cliwa~~g,
Qlntayba returned t o Merv .,
;~lonc>,Ic:rvi~~gt l ~ carmy to follow under his brother
Srilik, who carried out a number of minor raids oil t h e
y . It is ol,vious that, in spite of Balsdhuri's imaginative nccciunt, these raids must be located in the districts
ltc3ifil~bouri~~g
on tllc Oxus. The readings in Tabari's
11:irrntive arc, I~@\\~ever,
defective (3). Having t h u s
i~o1:itcrl Nc'zak in BZdghis, the heart of t h e revolt,
[,.!~lta$x~S \ K ? I I ~the winter months in negotiating w i t h
lli111 tllr(~ng11
Sulayn~" the Counsellor," an influential
I't!r~i:lll wllosc sltill in conducti~lgthe most difficult
n~'h'Otiatiolls pro~ccl more illan once of the u t m o s t
\';'lllc to Jjutayba. Nezalc was persuaded to surrellder
:uld was ~(111dllCt~d
to Mcrv, wllere peace was concluded
on coll(litio11that Qutayba would not enter ~ g d ~ l ~ i ~
perso11. AS a precautionaly measure however t h e
#cl\'cmor al~angedthat NezaIc sllould accompany him
ill all
cspeditions. Thus for the molnent at least, the
d W c r of an outbrealc in I<hur~s~l.n
was averted, in a
'nmlllc'c llononrable to both parties,
" ~ ) k IVaY back to China to await tile son of peraz
a more favourable
ol)portn~~ity
(4).
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In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of
the crossings at Amul and Zamm, opened his calnpaigns
in B u l ~ h % ~wit11
& 311 attack on Paylrand, From the
expressions of Narshakhi, on whose llistory of this
we may place more reliance since his details as a I-de
fit in with and supplement the other ilistol.ies, it
can be gathered that the principality of BukhSra was
weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority
of TughshCda and the regency of ICh%tiln,the alllbitious
nobles had struggled between tl~ernselvesfor the cl~ief
power ; most of the territories, includi~lgBukhirfi itself,
had been seized by the prince of Warrl,~naand the remaining districts seem to have been bmugllt under the
rule of Khunuk IChudSh, a noble who assulned the title
of Bulrhar Xhudah (5) Paylcand was thus more or less
isolated and, from Narshalclii's account, secms to have
been left to its fate. The battle with the Sughdinns
related in Tabari is an obvious anticipation from thc
events of the following year. After a siege of some two
months the city came to tenns with Qutabya, who left
it under a small garrison and, according to Tabari's
version, began the return march to Merv. A n kineute in
Payltand, however, brought liim back a t once. It seems
reasonable to assume that the citizens, illlagining
Qntayba's attaclz t o hnve been no more than a11isolated
raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as 11e retired.
The details given in Narshalrhi, that on Qntayba's add
vance towards BukharZ a certain citizen, a ~ ~ a g eby
the insulting conduct of the governor, Wlrqa' b. Nasr
al-Bzxli, attempted t o murder him, are trivial and
unconvillcing. Whatever the cause of tllc revolt may
have been, however, Qutayba took a ierriblc revenge.
In accordance
mediaeval practice the ralegadc city
was sacked, its fighting'lnen put to death, and its wornel'
and children enslaved. The booty taken from t'lisl the
first of the great trading cities of Central Asia
be
forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnidle(l inexhaustible
).
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for the exaggerated details of later tradition.
~l~~ ]nost ilnportant part nf the spoil was an arsenal of
\\rcapons and ar.mour, the excellence of which was s11ch
that the " forging of Sugl~d" appears in contenlporary
alongri(le the traditional " forging of Davicl " for
sclperlativc craftsmanship (6). With the consent of
IlajjSj, these weapons were not incIuded in the division
tllc booty but used to re-equip t h e army. T h e statelllc~,tthat there were only 350 suits of armour in the whole
army bcfore this is, however, of Bshilite provenance and
scarcely worthy of credence. T h e exemplary punishI U C I I ~ thns meted out by Qutayba to Paykalld at t h e
I~rgin~~ing
of his career was a stern warning t o N ~ z a l ca n d
t l ~ cSogdia~~s.Those wl~oaccepted Arab dominion would
I)c 1n1111a11cly
trcatccl, but any attempt at rebellio~lwould
11c ii~cxorably cruslled. Nevertlleless the sentence o n
I ' a ~ ~ k awas
~ ~ dso~newl~at
mitigated in the sequel, as
N;~rsl~akl~i
allds that tlle captives were ra~lsornedby t h e
~nrrc:l~a~~ts
of Payltancl on their return from the a n n u a l
irntlit~gcxl>cclitionto China, ancl the city, after lying in
ruins for n1r111yyears, was eventnally rebuilt.
The clisxster at Payltand roused the princes ancl
nlcrcl~antsof Trnnsoxania to the danger of neglecting t h e
illv;l(lcrs. Tl~efeud between WardZna and BukhZr3
(\.;IS pakhcd up ; round Wariljn I < h u d ~ ~ the
l ~ , central
figure arld oganiser of t l ~ cstruggle for independence,
g:ltllere(l the forces of all the nearer principalities. T h u s
wllcn Quta~~ba,
OII renewing his expedition in 881707,
take11 the outlying town of Tiimushltdh (not Nfilnusllkatll, wvllich was the earlier nalne of Bukharz)
Ksnfith:lna (or Rzmtin), 11e iound llis communications
cllt
tllc troops of Ward?ina, B u k h x r ~ ,and Sughd.
It is llot, ~ e r l l a ~ilnpossible
s,
that the prince of Fargh%na
dlcl'llrl have cooperated wit11 the Suglldialls, a s stated in
afadz'illi's account. On the other halld tile Arabic
narrati"cs are far from explicit, and tile Sughdians here
refrrrect arc lnucll lnore probably those of l(ish than of
Salnarqand, a suspicion wIlic11 is
by the
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i a ~ n o u spunning order of Hajjiij : " Crush ICish, destroy
Nasal, and drive Wardill] back." Narshakhi and Ya'qnbi gives an account of the negotiations between
Hayyan an-Nabati, representing Qutayba, and Tarkhan
king of Sughd, which is certainly to be put, with Tabari,
aftel: the conquest of Bulhiirii two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency,
common to the early chronicles of all nations, t o exaggerate the numbers ancl composition of the opposing forces.
As usual the Bd~iliteaccount carries this to the point of
absurdity by introducing a Tiirgesh force of no lcss than
200,000 men, an obvious ai~achronism,influenced by the
later Tiil-gesh invasions. The connection is nlade clear
by the inention of IICfir Maghalfin, whom we find nearly
thirty years later (Tab. 11. 1602. 2) as " one of the chiefs
of the Tiirgesh." The true account would seem to be
that Qutayba did not attempt to fight a pitched battle,
but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave
time for their natural inclination towards disunion t o
operate, then evaded ihcm by a rapid march through the
Iron Gate ancl, except for a rcarguard skirmish with the
enemy's cavalry, got his army clear across the river at
Tirmidh. The appointmalt of 'Abdur-RahmZn ibn
Muslirn to command the real-guard gives us the clue, as
it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted
all the most difficult commands. In the following year
Qutayba was still unable to make beadway against the
united forces of Wardiin IIChudiih, ICish and Nasaf, and
after protracted fighting (in spite of the double victory
claimed by the Bghilites) returned to Merv. For this
weakness he was severely reprimanded by Hajjzj, who,
with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The
i~ivasionof 00/709 seems to have taken Wardiin IIChudBh
by surprise, as the IvIuslim army was able to advance at
once to the siege of Bukhilrii. There is some ground for
the conjecture, however, that t l ~ edeath of WardZn
I<hudiih had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba
was opposed only by the local forces (7). This may also
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tile liesitation of tlie forces of Samarqand t o interTIle
battle before the walls of Bulthgrg is dcs,,crle,
cribcd by Tabari in a long Tamimite tradition reminiscent
f,
tile ancient" days," but tlie actual capture o f t h e city
is left to be iderred. This siege is transferred t o
WnrdSna by Vambery (cf. Heart of Asia P. 62)
l,rObably on the authority of the Persian Tabari (ZotenI , 111.
~ ~l ~ i j~ ) ,but Narshakhi, Tabari and all o t h e r
nu~llor.iticsquite definitely refer to BukhHriE. Abfi
'l]haydaEstradition (Bal. 420) of capture by treachery is
at best a confusion with the capture of Samarqand. All
tlla details given in Narsllalthi relative to Qutayba's
orgnnia;ltion of Uulcli%r%do not refer to this year ; m o s t
lnoh11)ly the only imlnediate measures taken were t h e
inllmsitioii oi a tribute of 200,000 dirhelns and t h e occupatioli o l t l ~ ccitadel by an Arab garrison.
A tliplomatic success followed the victory a t BukharB.
firkhfin, king of Sanlarqand, opened negotiatio~is w i t h
(!t~t;qlba, who was represented by the commander of h i s
llcrsi;~ucorps, Hayy?in an-Nabati, and terms were a g r e e d
I I ~ I O I I ,probably on the basis of the old treaty m a d e by
Salm ibn Ziyiid. Tarlthfiil gave hostages for the p a y m e n t
of tributc and Qutayba begail the march back t o Merv.
Cotrsolirlnlioic and Advance.
If tllc Aral~sretunled in the autulnn of B0/709 e l a t e d
nit11 tllcir success, they were soon given fresh cause f o r
:lnxict~. NEzak, finally realising that all hope of recoverilll: intlependcnce must be extinguished if Arab rule was
strengtll[!lle~lin I<hur&%n,and perhaps putting d o w n to
weakllcss Qutayba's willingness to gain his ends if possible
"Y di~llomacy,determined on a last effort t o overthrow
JIusliln sovereignty in Lower Tukllsristsn, at the moment
wl'cn it was least to be expected. Having obtained
mission to revisit his home, he left ~ ~ , att ~~~l
~ ~ b
and
for Balkll, ,but escaped to Tulthsrista in
avoid
From here he correspollded with tile
rlL1ersuf 13alkI1, blerv Rfidh, Tjlaqgn, F
~ and JGz~
~

1
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jgn, urging tlleln to undertake a coilcertecl rising ill the
s~rillg. Tile k h ~ gof Chagl~%ni%i~
seenls to llave refused
to countelllance tlle conspiracy, but the weal< ~
~ of b
T u l ~ h h i s t ~was
n induced, possibly by force, to l,lalce
common cause with NEzak, who hoped doubtless by this
nleans to unite all the subject priuces in defence of tlleir
suzerain.
Qutayba's army was already cfisbandecl a11~1the
winter was setting in. All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 men, under
'Abclur-Rahma, with instructions to winter in Ball&,
where they could counter any iinmecliate move by
NEzalc, and advance illto TulthBrist%n in the spriilg.
This resolute action made Qutayba master of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that wllen, in the early
spring, the Arabs marched through the clisaffected
districts, scarcely a blow was struck and the princes either
submitted or fled. The inhabitants were granted a
colnplete alnnesty except a t TalBqkl, concerning which
the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one
account, a band of robbers were there executed and
crucified, but it is possible that it was selected for special
severity because there alone the revolt had openly broken
out (8). -There was probably also some reorganization
of the administration of Lower Tulth%rista, in the
direction of conferring fuller powers on the Arab governors
h native prillces coninstalled ill each district, t h o ~ ~ gthe
tinued to exercise a nominai authority. From Balltll,
Qutayba marched forward and rejoi~led 'Abdu1.-Rahmzn, With the assistance of the lesser princes they
pursued and captured NEzalc, who was s~~bsequentl~
executed on direct orders from HajjBj, in violation of
~ ~ t ~promise
~ b of~pardon
' s (8). How little this action
was
by the prevailing spirit of the age, 1'0~ever, is shown by the contemporary poelns quoted
Tabari, laudillg the " defender of the precincts of Islam "
his action to the measures formerly
alld
adopted against the Jewish tribes of Maclina. Yet even

~
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a t tllis time \\re find traces of the new spirit that was t o
makc itself lllore felt in later years,and hear voices raised,
like Tllabit Qullla's, against the " treachery that calls
itself resolution." Tabari inserts at this point t h e
Ilarl:lti\rc of tile p u t t i ~ ~to
g death of the hostages of
JfixjfiIl,ill retaliation for the lllurder of t h e Arab hostage
In JtLjBn, a
more excusable incident. BalEdhuri
puts it at t ] ~ ebeginning of Qutayba's career, however,
as tllougll it bclo~~ged
to the first pacificatioll of L ower
l'~~kl~grisbdn,
so that its position in Tabari may possibly
IIC tluc to its superficial similarity with the case of NBzak.
The results of this exl~editio~l
were of the greatest import;uncc : not only was NBzalc's scheme crushed and L o w e r
'I'uklidrist311heliceforth i n c o ~ ~ o r a t in
e dthe Arab Em pire,
I)ut also for the first tinlc Arab authority was ext ended
cl\.csr tlic Jabghu and his immediate vassals in the O x u s
1,asin. 'I'Jic fonner, exiled to Damascus, formed a valua l ~ l oliostagc agaiust any attempt to regain indepa~ dence,
;111tl it sce~usnot improbable that the king of ChaghZniSn
\US made rcgcnt for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9 ) ,
'Abtli~r-l<aki~~an
was appointed governor of Balkh, in
ortlcr to su11cl.vise the administration of the new
l~o\~ince.
Qutayba l~adhardly returned to Merv before h e was
c:trlktl to deal with yet anotl~er revolt. T h e king of
Sl~ilmPri,taking advantage of the difficulties of the Arabs,
their absence in the southe~nmountains, had re- .
asscrtecl his indcpcndence in spite of t h e col~ciliatory
clffcrsof Sdlih ibn hlusliin. The full weight of Qutayba's
l'owcr was now employed to crush him. His strollghold
attacked wit11 siege artillery, the Iring himself l<ille,-J
in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. From tllis
lmillt Shfiman and fxkharfin gradually drop out of t h e
Arabic narratives altogether. Qutayba then resLulled
Inarch tllrouk!ll the Iron Gate, reduced t h e distric.ts of
Nasaf, altd revisited Bukhsr%, Tilerc seems
lo
colltinud fnction betweell the Arab
'Id tllc l~oi~ulatioll
((10) and it was felt that a drastic
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re-orgalisation was necessary. Tughsh~da,tllougll still
a youtll, was restored to the position of Bl\lrh.&r-I<lLil&~ll,
and the leaders of the hostile party (more probably thtlt
of Khunulc XhudEh than Wardan IIl~udSll)were
to
death. By this means, Qutayba 110 doubt ilopctl lo
secilre compliance and docility ill the native a < l l x ~ i n i ~ t ~ ~ tion. TughshEda had been raised to the tllronc by tllc
Arabs and it might be expected tliat he woul~lsictc witll
them in consequence. A more solid guarantee for tile
perlllallence of the conquest, however, was the establis11ment of a military cololly in Bukli?ir~i. Following the
precedent set in the coloriization of Merv, Arabs wcrc
lodged in the houses of the inhabitants, wlcl it is saicl tllat
the latter were encouraged to attend thc Priclay prayer
and behave as Muslims by the distribution oi a small
gratuity. The Rushan merchants left their honlcs and
property rather than comply with these ordc1.s : I I I ~
founded a new city outside tllewalls, but it is cviclc~~t
tint
the lsiamizatio~lof the city was not yot so thorough as
the traditions assert (11). The bl~ildii~g
of tlic &IOS[~IIC
and the organization of the Friday services are tlntetl by
Narshalrhi in 94 A.H., which points to a further orga~liaation of the city after the capture of Sa~narcland. Thc
organization of the new territories proceeded, in lact,
pari passu wit11 the extension and consolidatio~lof t l ~ c
conquests. So long as the Arab authority was insccurc
in Cisoxallia, it was out of the question to cstablisll
either lnaitary colollics or an elaborate adnliuistril 1'1011
beyolld the river. Consequently, it Was 0111~llow tllat
failure of Ntzak's revolt had clefinitely ~ecurecltile
~~~b dominion irl the former Eplithalite lands that it
was possible to talte the decisive stell of sctllillg an Arab
garrison in Bukll&rH. The regularity wit11 wliich ~ ~ 1 1
step followed the last suggests that it was dolie according
to a prearl-angcrJ
plall, or at least that some attention
had been devoted to the question of the administratioil
o~ the occupied territories in the event of the success of
the military operatiolls.
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Qutayba's reorgallizatioll was not confined to the
civil government, however, but exiel~cledto tile army as
well. Hitherto the jealousy of the Arabs for their
exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly limited
the number of Persians in the arinies, apart from the
clients and camp followers. Thus we are told (Tab. 1290.
20) that the armies of I<hurban at this period were
cornposed as follows : fro111 Basra - Ah1 al-'Aliya 9,000;
Bakr 7,000 ; Tmnim, 10,000 ; 'Abd a1 Qays, 4,000 ;
Azd, 10,000 : fro111 Kcfa, 7,000 : and alongside these
47,000 Arabs only 7,000 MawSli, commanded by HayyS~lan-Nabati, who is called variously a Daylamite a n d a
native of IU~ur&s&n,Now, however, Qutayba i~lll~osed,
first on BulthXrg, and later on each successive conquest,
the obligation of providi~lgrul auxiliary corps of local
trooys, amounting usually to some ten or twei~tythousand
men, to serve with the Arab armies. I t is possible, if
the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent
sct by Sa'id b. 'Othmb in tile conquest of Sarnarqand,
but more probable that it represents an entirely new
departure in the East, tl~oughit had long been a practice
in other s~>heres
of the Arab conquests.
We are given no hint of the motives which led t o t h e
adoption of the new system, though it would seein t h a t
tiley must have been of some force. Possibly i t was n o
more than a desire to keep the native armies occupied
in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in
their rear. H a j j ~ jand Qutayba perhaps realised too
that the Arab forces by themselves, after taking four
Years to reduce Bukh~riialone, were insufficient t o ensure
success in the greater task of subduing Samarqaild.
Ullder the ncm systein-which recalls Pan-ch'ao's famous
" Use barbarians to attack barbarians "-.
each concluest in turn made the next more easy. T h e
rapidity of Qutayba's later coliquests ill contrast with
e x l ~period is thus explained. I t is just possible
in this i > lQutayba
~
had an ulterior motive as well :
"le
of a Persian a m y , trained 011 the sallle
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lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to tile person
of the ~overliorancl able to take his part agaillst the
Arabs. E I o ~
very nearly this plan succeeded, even hi
~utayba'sown case, the sequel was to show.
The llractice of raising native levies, once started,
appears t o have become general in I<hur%zn. We have
no information as t o when the local forces of I<huZssn
and Lower TulchBrist2n were incorporated in tlie a m y ,
nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence
of tlieir presence and increasing prestige in thc wars of
the next forty y e a x (i2). On the other hand, though
contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by
later goverliors if they were available, as ill 106 and 112
A.H., in view of the wealcer hold of the Arabs on Transoxmia Sogdian troops never formed a regular division
of the Arab forces u p to the end of the Umayyad period.
This distiiictioil between the two subject Iranian groups
became, as will be seen, of some importance w11en the
'AbbEsid propaganda began to tamper with the loyalty
of the armies of I<hurb&.
While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bulchzrz, a detached force, sent under 'AbdiirRaltma~from I<ish t o Sarnarqand to exact from Tarkhiin
the tiibute agreed upon in the previous year, successfully
accomplished its mission.
'Abdur-Rafcmxn, after
restoring the hostages to Tarlchfin, rcjoined his brother at
BulcliLrB, whencc they returned t o Merv for the winter.
One important vassal of TulthZrist&n, who liad 1o11g
been a tliorn in the side of HajjZj, still remained unsubdued. 'rllis was Rutbil or Zunbil, the Turkish ruler of
Zgbulistsn (la). I n 91, the viceroy united Sijistsn to
the proviilce d KhurZsBn, with instructions t o Qutayba
to unclertalce a campaign in person against Rutbil. In
following year, therefore, thc expeditions into Transoxallia were interrupted, and the army agaill Inarched
soutl1wards. To Qutayba's great relief (for he disliked
to ulldertake a canlpaig~lagainst this fornlidable
who llacl lnade Sijistan " ail ill-omened frontier ")

.
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Rutbil hastened to tender his subnlission, and at the sarne
time sent an embassy to convey his homage lo the
Bmperor of China (14). Recognition of Arab suzerainty
over Z?tbulist%n involved of course only the payment of
a fixed tribute, ancl no attempt was made at a permanent
occul~ation.
Meauvllile a serious situatioil had arisen in Sughd.
Tile l~lerchal~ts
and nobles of Sa~narqandhad resented
the wealilless of their lcir~gand the payment of tribute :
in Qutayba's absericc the party for resistailce d oztlraace
gained the upper hand, and Tarkhtn, deposed on the
grouilcl of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice
of the electors fell 011 Ghiirak (15),a prince of whom we
would gladly have known more. Under the ever incre'asing clificulties with which he was confronted during his
twenty-seven years of rule, his consu~n~nate
handling
01 the n o s t confused situations shows
to have beell
at once statesnlan and patriot, and preserved his kingdonl fro111repeated disaster. The action of the Sugl~clian
nobles, lio~vever,the Arabic account of which is col~iirmed
by the Chhcsc records, coilstituted a challa~get o Arab
pretensions whicl~Qutayba could ]lot be slow in answering. These considerations clearly disprove t h e partial
tradition of Abii 'Ubayda (Bal. 422), lo the effect t h a t
Qutayba treacherously attacked I<hw~riznland Sanlarq m d in spite of the treaties of Sa'id i b i ~'Othman, and the
argument based upon it by van Vloten in L a Dorni%atio,r
Auabe, must also, in consequence, be somewhat modified.
The winter of 931711, therefore, was spent in preparatiorls lor an expedition against Samarqand, but
before the opening of the cainpaigning season, Qutayba
received a. secret ruission from the IChwLriz~n SllSh,
wllo offered to beconie tributary if the Arabs would rid
lliln of his rebellious bl-oilier I<hurrazZdl~. Qutayba
agreed, and after publicly announcillg his intention of
invdmg Sughd, suddenly al~pcaredat Hazarasp. The
followers of the I<h\vLrizm Shnh wcrc persuaded t o offer
no resistance for this year, at least, and accepted the
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terms, which included, ill accordance wit11 tllc llew
scheme, the provision of a corps oi 10,000 at)lcbodied
lllen as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba rclnnined ;,t
tile capital (16) until tlie army was collcctcd, wllilc
'Abdur-Rahm~nwas employed, according to T'ahlri, ill
reducing the Icing of RhLmjird, wlio from tbc l,arallel
account in BalHdhuri is to be iclc~itifiedcitller t$riill
IChurrazLdh, or a t least with his party. Tile lJcrsiall
Tabari adds a long and cloubtless lege11da1.y ~ ; I ~ . I ~ L L I . C
of liis surrender. Four t h o u s a ~ ~prisoners
d
were takcll
and butchered, probably by order of the l<lnv%riz~n
Sl~nll.
The later history of IChw2rizm under Qutayl~a'srule
is an unhappy one. His fiwt governor Iyas b. 'Abrlullal~,
proved too weak for his post, ancl 011 Qutaybu's tvitlldrawal tlie KliwPrizmians rose in revolt and put to dcnt11
the king who had betrayed them. ly% was r c ~ ~ l l cind
disgrace, together wit11 the Persian Hayyan all-Nabati,
who had been associated with hinl, and Qutayba's
brother 'Abdullah (in BalZdlli~ri 'Ubnydnllnh) was
appointed as temporary regent until, after il~ccapture
of Samarqand, a strong force uitder nl-hl~~gl~ira
b.
'Abdullah could be sent to effect a reconquest. Q~~tayl~n's
retribution on this occasio~lexceeded eve11 tlic terror of
Paykand and Shan~Bn. We am told by Al-UirlSni that
the educated classes and more cultured clc~~tei~ts
in
Khw5rizm were slaughtered allnost to cxlinciiol~. Hc
refers this by implicatio~l'totlie seco~id expcditioll of
Qutayba (though it does not appear tlrat t11c governor
led the expedition in person), which is borilc out by \$,hat
we know of Qutayba's methods in similar cnscs, while
there js 110 instance in his career of such an action 011 a
first conquest. ~t was in all probability the educatecl
classes (including no doubt tlle hierarchy) \rho
revolt against the traitor lting and lllus met wit11 l-1'~
severest punishment. The dynasty, llowcvcr,
maintained, alld it is not inlprobable that the Arab
of which we hear shortly afterwards was settLcc' in
Rhw2rizrn at the salne time (17).
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The booty from the first expedition into I<hwZrizrn
was enougll to satisfy Qutayba's ttoops, who demandecl to be allowed to return to their hoines, but a
sudden thrust a t Sarnarqand proiuised such success that
Qutayba a11d his leaclers cleciclecl to malce the attempt.
The Suglldia~ianarmy had, apparently been disbanded,
a n d under cover of a false lnovement of the advance
guard, the Arabs marched directly on Sarnarqand. The
aclvwlce guard under ' Abdur-RalzmLn numbered 20,000
men, while the main body included the new Persian
co~ltingentsfrom Iihwlrizm and BulthSrZ. The march
occupiecl only a few clays and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent the Arabs from proceeding
a t once to invest the city. Ghfiralr conducted the defence
with vigour, however, and appealed to ShLsll and Fargh&% for assistance, relnindiilg them that Sarnarqand was
t h e bulwarlr of the Jaxartes valley. A strong force was
despatched from ShLsh with the intention of ~nalcinga
surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was amnbushecl a t
~ i i g hby
t a pickecl troop oi Arabs and almost annihilated.
This reverse, together with the continuous bon~bardlnent
t o which they were subjected, disheartened t h e Suglldians,
but the wall l ~ a dbeen breached and an entrance a11nost
effected by t11e Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new
Iratlian divisions, before Ghiiralt sued for peace.
Qutayba's demands were unexpectedly light-an annual
tribute, stateti in widely varying amounts, ancl a strong
corps of Sugl~dians,together with a stipulation that t h e
city sllould be cleared of its fighting men while t h e Arabs
boilt a ~nosqueand celebrated the ritual prayers. Once
~ ~ i t h ithe
n gates, however, Qutayba refused t o restore
t h e city to Ghilrak : a strong garrison was established
in tlie ciladel, under ale conlmaild of 'Abdur-RahmEn
(so Ya'qBbi; in Tahari 'Abdullah) and drastic orders
were isstled excluding all unbelievers except under strict
surveillance, doubtless with the intention of avoiding
a repetitioll of the friction that: had occurred at BukhLrs.
Ghfirak cither could not or wo~llclnot place himself in
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the humiliating position of Tugl~sl~Bda,
and wit11 llis
retinue, accompanied possibly by the merchants, witlldrcw
from Samarqand altogether and built a nejv city, Iiarnrll a t h , some four farsaklls distant ill the dircctioll
Ishtikhan (18). Qutayba's doable-dcaliug ou tllis
occasion, however, tarnished his reputation alllong bolll
Persians ancl Arabs, far more than liis severity to Paykarld
and I<hwdrizm, and left a rankling menlory in Srlglld.
In order to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to
their hero the Bzhilite tradition relates this cxpetlitiorl
in an entirely different version (19). Qutayba, \17c arc
told, after marching down the right bank of t l ~ c0x11s
and collecting his army at BulrhB1-2, advanced to RabilijZn where he was met by the Sugl~diansunder Ghfimk,
supported by the troops of ShZsh and Iiargli~naa~ltltl~c
Turks. The cncmy retired on Saniarqand but cngagcd
in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally
entered b y force after a decisive battle in tlic subu~~bs.
Though this account is at first sight borne out to son~e
extent by Ghfiralc's own narrativc in liis letter to the
Emperor of China, in which he claims an intitial succcss
against the Arabs, but was unable t o prcvcnt their
advance, both statements must be regarded as exngge1.atiolls in opposite interests. A t all events it is quite
certain that nonc but Sughdiw troops were involvctl at
first.
A further clevelopment of the Bd~ilitetradition lias
given rise to some controversy. According to illis,
GhErak appealed for help not o111yto ShSsIl but also to
the RhBqgn, arid the squadron sent from Slitis11 apl,cars
as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of tllc I < h B q i ~ i .
This is, of course, an obvious exaggeration on the formel.
narrative. I n tlie Turkish Orkhon inscriptions, liowcvcr,
an expedition under the prince I<iil-tegin into Sogdiann
" t o organize the Sogdian people " is mentioned, followirig
on a successful campaign against the Tiirgesh in 710/711.
Marquart endeavours to prove that this cxl>edition
occurred in 712 and is, in fact, co~roboralcdby (Ire
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BZhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has raised
several objections to this view, the most important being
that the cl~rouologyof the inscriptions has lo be manipulated to allow of this date, as tlie natural date to assume
froin the contest is at latest 711. These, together with
the consideratiolis mentioned above, render Marquart's
hypotliesis absolutely untenable.
A sccond suggestion has been put forward by Professor
Barthold, to which, however, Professor Houtsma's
objections would apply with equal force (20). I n the
narrative of the historian Ya'qfibi (11. 314), there is a
brief notice as follows : " Qutayba appointed his brother
'Abdur-RnhinFm ibn Muslim goveillor of Samarqand,
but the Inen of Sa~narqandtreacherously revolted against
him, and l<ht%qai,lcing of the Turks, attacked him also.
H e wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the
winter cleared, then ~narchedto join him and routed the
army of the Turlcs." Prafessor Bartholcl takes the view,
therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in tlie
iuscriptio~~s~
m c l attril~utesthe failure of the Turlrs to
tliedisastrous effects of a winter campaign in a devastated
la~ld,wliicli SO severely disabled them that they could
not iace the formidable army that took the field under
Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however,
how far Ya'qiibi's narrative may be trusted. None of
the other ldstorians give the slightest hint of this
invasion, nor were the results such as we should expect
after a Suglidian revolt. There was no ruthless reconqnest, no stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither
docs the general tenor of Ya'qilbi's accounts of Qutayba
inspire confidence. They are not only confused in detail
and cl~ronology-the capture of Samarqand, for instance,
is dated 94 AH.--but in some cases are talcell from w h a t
we know to be the Bahilite tradition, and in others,
such as the narrative under discussion and the account of
t h e collquest of Iihwiirizm, follow a tradition which
s e e m irreconcilal>lewith our other infor~nation. W l ~ i l e
i t callnot be said definitely therefore, that Ya'qfibi's
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statements in this case coiltai~ino trntll, it is certainly
preferable to regard them a s a later development of the
narrative, on the lines of the Bal~ilitetradition.
If the chronological objectio~lsraised by Professor
Houtsma are sound, there reinains still a third possible
solution, which, however, as tliere is no con-oborativc
evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, must
remain nothing b u t a hypothesis. I t is surely cluitc
tenable that Icd-tegin's " organizatioil of t11e Sogdiall
people " had something to do with t l ~ edeposition of
Tarkhfin and appointment of GMralc. With Sogclian
trade playing the most important part which wc know
in the Turkish lands, it would be well worth whilc to try
to prevent the Arabs from obtaiuing control over it.
The very unexpectedness of the description givcn to this
expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for
" organization " and it is clifficult t o see what other
motive there could have been. These circumstnilces
would render it quite probable that GhGralc did, in fact,
appeal t o t h e IShBq%n.for assistance against the Arabs,
but it seems that the growing power of thc Tiirgesl~
barred the way into Sogdiana against t l ~ cNorlhern
Khanate for the remainder of its sllort existence.
By the conquest of Samarqaild Qulayba fillally established his position in Transoxania. It must not be
assamed, however, as many of the Arab historians give
the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand
meant the conquest of Suglld. All that had beell done
was to settle a n Arab garrison in a colllltr~ as yet
unfriendly. I t was the cluty of the conllnanders at
Samarqa1ld gradually to extend their a u t l l o ~ i tover
~ the
the whole district of Sughd by expeditions and
(91). There \"as thus a radical difference between the
collquest of BukhSrZ and 'that of Samarqand. The
former was the result of a series of campaips in which
the resources of t h e country had been exhausted and the
province annexed piecemeal. The whole P
~ had
become subjects of the Arabs a i d Were under constallt
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surveillance : TughshS.da llimself held his ranlr on sufferance ancl was compelled to maintain at least a n outward
show of loyalty. But: Sainarqancl had been captured
in one swift thrust ; Sughd as a whole was still unsubdued
and only from policy aclrnowledged the suzerainty of the
Arabs for the time being. " Ghfiralr at Ishtilrhan was
free t o t u r n either to the Arabs or to the Turks " (18).
Nevertheless in the years that followecl there is evidence
that friendly relations were formed between the Arab
garrison and many of the local leaders and inhabitants
(3). T h e whole country, however, had suffered terribly
in the constant iilvasioils and counter invasions. A
contenlporary poet gives a vivicl picture of its dissipated
wealth, its ruinecl and desolate lands :
'

"Daily Qniayba gatbels spoil, increasing om. wealth with new
wealth : A BZllilitc who has worn the crown till the hair that w a s
black has whitencd. Sughd is subdued by his squadrons, its
people left sitting in nalcedncss . . As oft as he lights in a land,
his horse leavc it furrowed and scarred."

.

The Ex$editions iwto the Jaxartes Provinces.
I t might pcrliaps have been expectecl that Qutayba's
next object after the capture of Samarqand would be t o
establish Arab authority in Sughd as firmly a s had been
done in BukllarE. I t would probably have been better
in the end liacl he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the " forwarcl policy " wllich had already provecl
so successful were too strong. Instead of concentrating
on the reduction of Suglid, it was decided t o push t h e
frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, ancl
leave the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba
therefore crossed to BulthhB, where 20,000 levies from
.Khw&riz~n,
Bulrhzra, Rish, and Nasaf had been summoned
t o ineet him, and marched into Sughd. If there was a
Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered n o
considerable resistance to the advance of the Arabs.
I11 Sughd Q ~ ~ t a y bdivided
a
his forces into two corps.
The Persian levies were sent in the direction of Sh3,sh,
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while he himself with the Arabs niarclled on I<llujnllda
and ParghBna. Our information is brief and lackillg in
detail. Of tile northern expeclitio~l we are told only
that they captured ShBsh a n d bunlt the greater part of it.
Qutayba's own force had t o overcome sonle resistance
a t Ichujanda, but eventually reacl~edIGis~n,where it
was rejoined by the other. The geographers refer also to
a battle fought by Qutayba at Minalc in Ushrfisana, but
against wllorn is not clear (23). Tabari (1440. 7)
preserves a tradition t h a t Qutayba appointed an Amb
resident, 'IsBrn b. 'Abclullah al-B~ihili, in Fargh8na.
If this is true, as seems n o t nnliltely, the appointment was
probably macle during this year. The details of the
tradition are quite tunacceptable, however. No Arab
governor would ever have taken up liis residence in a hillpass in the remotest district of Farghjna, conlpletcly
cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of Bal&dhuri's
authorities carries this 01- a similar tradition further by
crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab
colonies as far as Shssh and Farg113na. Here again at
most only temporary military outposts can be in question.
On the other hand, the extraordina1.y success achievcd
by the Arabs on this expedition is apt to be ovcrloolied,
and Qutayba might well l ~ a v imagined,
e
as hc returned to
Merv, that the latest conq~iestswere as permsnelltly
annexed to I < h u B s ~ na s Sarnarqa~cIand I<hwiirizm.
The helplessness of their Turkisli suzerain in face of
the victorious Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of Chinese overlorclship. Al)pcals
to the IChXqBn were of n o avail, and in the minds of the
Sogdian princes, seeltiilg for some counterpoise to tile
rapid extension of the A r a b conquests, the idea of aplicaling djrectly t o the Emperor was slowly ~natllring.Thougll
no definite steps in this direction had as yet been taken,
some inlrling of it m a y have reached Qutayba. Tile
Arabs were now familiar wit11 China through tile seabolne trade of the p e ~ s i a nGulf and at least after, if
before, their collquest of thc cities which were already
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becoming the headquarters of Central Asian comrnercc.
must have become aware of the close commercial relations
which these cities maiiltaii~ed.withChina. Under tllcse
circumstances, Qutayba (or possibly FIajjXj) clecided to
send a mission ovedancl to the Chinese court, possibly
to prevent their intervention in the West, but more probabIy with the intelltion of promoti~lg trade ].elat'1011s.
As the princes of Sogcliana and Tulth?iristXn were much
more alive to the advantages of preserviug their colllinerce
ailcl t o t h e dangers which might befall it under the ile\\.
goverilme~ltthan the Arabs could have been, i t was
probably on their suggcstio~lthat the embassy was sent.
They would, of course, have no difficulty in persuading
governors oi the character of HajjZj and Qutayba that
their own intcresls also lay in safeguarding ancl encouraging the tracle which brought such wealth to Transoxanin.
If the intervention of the Turlts had been caused by their
collcerll for Sogclia~ltrade, it became cloubly importa~lt
for the Arabs t o show their practical interest in its welfare.
Apart from the immcdiate gain to the treasury which
would accrue, such a11 action might reasonably be expectccl
to secure t l ~ eacquiesceilce of the Sogdians in Arab rule.
The clate of the mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese
recorcls, which adcl also that in spite of the refusal of the
envoys t o pcrform the customary kow-tow it was favourably received b y the Emperor. Both statements arc
co~~firmed
b y Tabari's remark that the leader was sent
t o Walid on his return, which must therefore be datecl
between the death of Hajjfij and the end of 714 (24).
Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been
confused with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two
years later, becoming so disfigured in the process as t o be
almost worthless. The wisdom of this step must have
been justifiecl b y its results, though there are no effects
appareilt in our histories and the relentless march of
Chinese policy was uot affected. This embassy is
mentioned by t h e Arabic llistorians as if it were an isolated
incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere (25),
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only the first of many such sent by the governors of
IChurCsjn to maintain frialclly relations with the Chinese
court. It cannot be doubted that in the majority of
cases at least the object of these missions was commercial,
particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or
other of the Sogdian principalities.
In the following year 951714 the raids on the Jaxartes
provinces were renewed. I t wlould seem on comparing
Balsdhuri's account with Tabari that Qutayba made
ShXsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as
Isbijiib. The prince of Shash appealed to China for
assistance, but without effect (26). Qutayba's plan
therefore was to follow up the important trade-route
which led from Turfan clown the Ili valley, along the
northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through
Tokmak and Tariiz into Shiish and Samarqand. Though
the economic importance of controlling this trade-route
may have had its part in this decision, especially in view
of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable
that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its
strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian
Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of
the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted
by the news of the death of Hajjsj, which had occurred
in Shawwd (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his
patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own
fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons
to BukhjrB, Icish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv.
WaIid, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter,
and made his province independent of 'IrBq. But the
death of Hajjjj llad affected IChurBsBn too deeply for
such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in
their expeditions, they were weary of the constant
campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace.
Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new element of unrest had been added by a ICfifan corps under
Jahm b. Zahr, which had been transferred to IChurXsiXn
from India by Hajjgj in his last year. All parties among
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tllc ~~~b~ were alienated froin Qutayba ; even g a y s h a d
been estranged by his highhanded actioll in t h e first
place ,vitjl the iiouse of Al-Ahtam and again b y his f e u d
waltiCb, Abi Siid, the chicf of Tamiln (27); moreo,rcr,
were suspicious of his lneclizing tendencies.
rimollgst the Persians he was popular, but H ~ Y YallS~
Naba& tllougll restored to his position in command of the
I+rsian Lrool~s,had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace
a t I<llwzrizm. It seems extraordinary that t h e general
Ililnscll should have been blind to any intel~laldanger
and was clltircly confident in the loyalty of his army.
On re-opeiiing the campaign in 96/716, therefore, his
oilly 1)rccautionsconsistcd in the removal of his family a n d
l)crsollal property fro111 Mcrv to Samarqand a n d t h e postilig ol n guard 011 the Oxus, in view of a possible restoration io fnvonr of Yazicl b. Muhallab. It is unliliely t h a t
()t~taybn coulcl have hacl in mind the possibility of
\Valid's death ; what he feared was more probably a
~rlfiproclrel>re+tt
bctwcen the Caliph and his heir SulaymSn,
who was liis biitcr encmy.
Thc object of this last campaign was probably t h e
colilplete s~~bjugation
of FarghZua. Having established
his authority over the important section of the Middle
Jaxartes and its trade route,it rclnained now t o round off
11is conquests by cxtmdiug it also over the central t r a d e
rontc between FarghZna and Kashgaria. The accoullt
~vliichTabari intends to convey, however, is that Qutayba
mnrcl~ecl first into FargllZila and from there led a n
expedition against Icashgar, with complete success. In
article of mine published in the Bttlletir, of the
School of Oriental Stztdiss (11. 467 ff.), all our eviclei~cefor
tllis cx~eclitionhas been critically discussed, and showll to
bc against tile autI~enticityof the tradition. It is unI1eceSSalY, therefore, to do more than summarise very
the WgutIIents there put forward. (1) Nolle of
llistorians earlier than or contemporary with ~
~
colltain ally reference to a raid on I<ashgar, ancl even
Tabxi's own stateinelit is not borne out by the autllor-
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ities 011 whicli it professedly rests. Only one 01 these
relates an expedition to I<ashgar, and that under the
command of a n ullk~lown leader. (2) Thc interval
between the opening of t11e campaign and tlie cleat11 of
Qutayba in FarghBna in August or Septeiuber does not
allow time for such a n expedition, especially in view of
attitude of the army after the death of the
the ~nuti~lous
Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference in
FarghBna cannot refer, for clironological reasons, to
Qutayba's expedition, and in any case is silent on any
attaclc on Icashgaria.
That an expedition of this sort sliould have been
attributed t o Qutayba is not surprising, in view of tlie
tradition of the embassy t o China, and of the greatrenown
which attached to h i s memory. Later tradition (28)
recounted that Hajjzij pledged the governorship of China
t o the first to reach it of his two governors in the East,
Mulzammad b. Qxsi~n and Qutayba. " Sin " was, of
y days, but
course, not the sharply, clcfined c o ~ ~ ~ ioft r our
rather a loose term for the Far East, including even tlie
Turltish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably
done little Inore than malte preparations for his campaign,
perhaps to the extent of sending out millor raiding
expeditions, when the news of the death of Walid brought
everything t o a standstill.
The historians give the most contradictory accounls
of the events that followed : accordi~~g
to Bal%dhuri
the new Caliph SulaymLn confirmed Qutayba in liis command but gave perlnission to the army to disband.
Tabari's narrative, with which Ya'qfibi's in general
agrees, is fully discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), togetller
with a valuable analysis of Qutayba's position. Tile
story of his l1ighhauded negotiations wit11 SulaymZll
is too well ltnown to ileecl repetition. Fiiidiug the nrlny
disik~clinedto follow him, h e completely lost his head and
roused the mutiny in \v11ich he was ltilled. The Persia11
levies, who were inclined to side with him, were dissuadc(1
by Ilayyan an-Nabati, n ~ l dat tlie last ollly his owl
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family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained
faithful.
The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of
t]le Arab conquests in Central Asia for a quarter of a
century, but tlie beginning of a period of retrogression.
Under Waki' b. Abi SBd, his successor (20), the armies
melted away. Mulrhallad, the son of Yazid b. Mul~allab
and his lieutenant in Transoxat~ia,canied out summer
raids on the villages of Sugl~d,but an isolated attempt on
the Jaxartes provinces by 'Omar's governor, Al-JarrZlt
b. 'Abclullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly
to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold
(Turbcsta~,160), of the disaster met with by a Muslim
army refers. On the other hand an embassy was sent in
tlle name of tlie Caliph to renew relations with the
Clliliese court, and a third in concert with tlie ltingdoms of
TulltBrist%n and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of
'Omar (25). There is mention also of an expedition into
ICliuttal wl~ich regaitled some territory. But it was
Qutayba, with Hajjiii a t his baclr, who had held his
conquests together, and when lie disappeared there was
neither leader nor organisation to talte his place. The
history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and
unstable was thc authority of the Arabs. It was force
that had made the conquests, and only a settled policy
of force or coilciliation could hold them. The first was
absent. " Qutayba in chains at the worId's end is more
terrible to us than Yazid as governor in our very midst "
is the graphic sumnlary put into the mouths of t h e
conquered, while of Rutbil, king of Zibnlistiin, we are
told expressly that after the death of Hajjzj "he paid
not a ccnt of tribute to any of the govenlors of Sijistiin
on behalf of the Umayyads 'nor on behalf of Abii
hluslim." (30).
Nor was 'Omar's policy a true policy of conciliation,
based as it was iiot on the maintenance of the Arab
collquests but on the co~npleteevacuation of Transoxania.
His orders t o that effect were of course indignantly

rejected by Llle Arab colonists ul Bulthiira and Samaqand,
but together with his appointment of the feeble and
ineffective 'Abdur-Rahrn~tl b. Nu'ayin al-Qushayri as
governor, s u c h a policy was naturally coilstrued by the
Sogdialls a s mere weakness, and an invitation to regain
their independence. In addition to the embassies to
China, to be related in the next chapter, and possibly also
some negotiations with the Tiirgeslr, Ghiirak sought to
win back h i s capital by playing on 'Omar's piety. The
Caliph sent envoys t o the princes of Sogdiana calling on
them to accept IslBm, and Ghiirak, outwardly professing
his adherence, sent a deputation to 'Oinar urging that as
"Qutayba dealt with us treacherously and tyrannically,
but God h a s now caused justice and equity i-o reign "
the city should be restored to the Sughdians. The
commonsense of the judge appointed to try the case on
'Omar's instructions by the governor of Sanlaqand,
SulaymZn b. Abi's-Sari (himself a mawlii), solved the
problem in a n eminently practical manner, and we are
told that his decision, so far from being " malicious,"
was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Suglidians, if
not perhaps t o Ghiirak. Beyond the relnission of ltl\araj,
it is doubtful whether 'Omar's administration benehted
the subject peoples in the slightest, and the ~.enction
which followed his brief reign only aggravated the
situation. Already before its close the Sughdians had
withdrawn' their allegiance (31).
Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba,
rnuch of his work was undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islam was built, and laid
them well, though his own superstructure was too flimsy
to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the
fault was n o t entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault
of the builder. He was snatched away before his work
was done, even if in his latter years he tellded to neglect
everything else for military glary. AS we shall see, there
was no peace in Transoxanja until other men arose, great
and strong enough to adopt and carry out tile best of
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nlthlessness
and
ferocity of his conquests,.
llis
llowever, llave been mnch exaggerated. He was always
ready to use cliplomacy rather than force if it offered ally
]lope of succc~s,SO much so that his lenience was miscotlstrucd 011 occasion by both friends and foes. Only
in cases of treachely aud revolt his punishment came swift
alld terrible. That he did not hesitate to take vengeallce
011 bis private enemies is to say no more than t h a t h e was
Arab. I t was ilot without reason that in later days
the Muslir~lsof Central Asia added Qutayba's name t o
thc roll of nlartyrs and that his tomb in FarghZna became
a favourite place of pilgrimage (32).
To surn up the position in Central Asia in the years
i~nmecliaielyfollowing Qutayba's conquests :(1) Lower Tukharistan and CliaghZniSn formed an
integral part of the Arab Einpire.
(2) Tnklialistxn, now in the decay of its power, was
hcld as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine
provinces oI ICliuttal, ICum~cIh,etc., where, however, the
Arab authority was rnuch weaker.
(3) In Sogcliana, Bultl~drZwas regarded a s a perrnanent conquest and gradually colo~lized; S u g h d was
still hostile territory held by strong outpost garrisons in
Samarqand and ICisll, co~~nected
to Bukhba by minor
posts.
(4) I<hwaizm as a military power was negligible and
was permanently colonized.
(5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes 1-emained
independent, hostile, and relatively strong, supported
by the Turltish power to the North East and also by the
intervention of China.
(6) Usllriisana, tllough u~lsubdned,does n o t seem t o
have offered ally obstacle to the passage of Arxb armies.
(7)
existing dynastic houses were everywhere
as
1-epr.ese11tatives of the collquered
l?eo~lesaid vellicle of the civil administratioIl., The
administrative and financial authority in their
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territories, however, passed l o the Wiili, or agent of the
Arab governor of I<huriisZn (33).
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IV. THE T U R K I S H COUNTERSTROICE (1)

THEprinces of Transoxania had so long been accustonled
to regard the Arabs a s mere marauders that it was some
time before they could realise the loss of their independence. Though necessity fo~cedthem at first to adopt a
conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance
of Isl2m under 'Omar II), they were dismayed to find all
the machinery of permanent occupation set in motion,
and their authority Aouted by tactless and g~eedyArab
officials. Such a s t a t e of affairs was tolerable oiily in the
absence of any countering force. The situatioii was not
stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba's
death other and disturbing factors had begun to enter.
Our best clue t o the complications in Transoxania during
this period is the attitude of Ghtilak, king of Sugl~d,of
whose movements, fortunately, sufficient indications havc
been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance
between the Turgesh a n d the Arabs, his true statesman's
instinct seldom misled him in judging l~owand when to
act to advantage tl~roughout his troubled reign. In
addition to this we h a v e the evidence, unreliable in detail
but confirmatory in ille mass, of the embassies sent by
the subject principalities t o the Chinese court. Doubtless
they were despatched in the guise of commercial missions
and in Inany cases were trulyso, bnt that they frequently
possessed a political character can hardly be denied.
The dates of these embassies as given in the authorities
translated by Chavannes fall natu~.aDyinto fo111. periods.
I n the following list all embassies have been onlitted in
which the Arabs are known to have participated or urhose
object is known t o h a v e had no connection with the Arab
conquests, as weL1 as those which appear to be dui)licated,
and those from the minor states :
60

717-731 Suylld 11, i h k l ~ i r i s t r iG.Uul~l~?~rh
~~
2, Arabs
2. 782-740
,, nolm
,,
2
,, none ,,
3. 741-787
,, 4
3
,
1 ,,
4. '780-785
, 4
2
,
3 ,,
1.

4.
1(733).
4

0

Thesc four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond
t o the fluctuations of Arab autllority in Transoxania.
In the same year, 713, that Qntayba first led his army
across tile Jaxartes, a new era of westward expalision
opened in China with the accession of EIiuen-Tsong.
In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs of the Tell
Tribes and obtained their iinmediate submission, while
in the followillg year they restored the deposecl Icing of
FargllSna. In 716, 011 the death of Me-chu'o, Khan of
t l ~ eNorthern Turks, the powerful tribes of the Tiirgesh
asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu
establisl~ecl,with Chinese assistance, a new ltingdom in
the Ili basin. The princes of Transoxahia eagerly sougllt
to profit by these developnlents to free tl~cillselvesfroill
the Arab yoke. In 718 a joiilt emnbassy was sent to China
by Tuglishfida, GhBrak, NarayZna king of ICuiniidh,
and tlle king of Chaghanifin. The first three presented
petitions for aid against the Arabs, which are give11 in full
in Cliavannes' Doct.~ntetcts. I'ughshZda asked that the
Tiirgesh might be ordcred to attack the Arabs, Ghfiralt
related the capture of Samarqand and aslted for Chinese
troops, Narayaa conlplained of tlle seizure of all his
treasures by the Arabs and asked that represe~ltations
might be made to induce them to remit their crushing
taxation. It is significant that the king of ChaghSniiin,
acting for his suzerain, the Jabgllu of Tukh%ltstBn, did
not coinproinise himself by joining in these requests.
But beyo~lcld" fair words " the son of Heaven took no
action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, i n spite of the repeated entreaties addressed by the
princes to their self-elected suzerain.
The Tiirgesh, however, were not Iong in iiltervening on
their own account. Whatcver opport~uity the Arab
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governnlellt h a d to pacify the Suglldians was lost by n
succession of incoinpetent govenlors. Alrcacly in the
reign of 'Omar 11, as has been seen, they had withclrajvn
their allegiance froin tlie weak 'Abdur-Rahm?in 11. Nn'aym.
For a moment the situation seemed to improve at tlle
beginning of the governol-ship of Sa'id " IClludi~ayna"
(102/720) owing to t h e firm handling ol Samarqaild by
his lieutenant Shu'ba b. Zuliayr. But disturba~lces
broke out a n d Sh~l'bawas recalled, perhaps in a vain
attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seen1 that
the Sughdians appealed to the new Turkish powcr in
theEast ancl Su-Lu, unable to ~nalteheadway against the
growing influence of China, \irillingly scized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Tcansoxania. A small
Tiirgesli force was sent under Icol-cliur (called by Tahari
ICLirsiil) (2) to m a l e comlnon cause with tlic Sughclian
rebels in the following spring (end of 102). Sa'id abvolce
to iind the whole country in arms, a Turltisli force rnarcliing on Sarnarqand, and the local priuccs, with few
exceptions, aiding t h e invnders. The ~ i r a bcommanders
could not rely on their levies and a small garison a t
Qasr al-B8hili was evacuated only wit11 llie ut~nost
difficulty. The tale of their relief by a srnall force of
volunteers is one of tlie most spirited narmtives of
adventure i n Tabari. But such episodes did not aflect
the gcileral success of tlie Turltish forces. I<iirstl
continued h i s advance through Sughd witliout opposition,
avoiding S a n a r q a n d , until at last Sa'icl was roused by
public reproach lo march agaiust the Turlrs. After a
small initial success, which he refltsed to follow up, he
was severely defeated and confii~eclto tlie neighbourhod
of ~ a r n a r ~ a n r lThe
.
Turks werc not strong enough to
undertalce a siege' of the city, as the wliole operation
seems t o h a v e been little more than a recon~laissancein
force combined with a raiding expedition. As the
Tiirgesh retired, the Arab cavalry folloaed
U P as
far as Waraghsar, the head of the canal systelnof Sughd.
Gllijrak appears to have refrained from colnlnitting him-
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and doubtless recognised
self by openly aiding t l ~ rebels,
t h a t the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. Prom
t l ~ efact t l ~ a tSa'id's camp was pitched at Ishtilthan,
in close proximity to him, it may even be conjectured
that lie outwarclly supported the Arabs.
B u t the new governor of 'Iraq, 'O~narb. Hubayra,
was not the-man to stand idly by in face of the danger
t h a t threatened I<hur&Bn. The wealcness shown by
RhudhLyna and the conlplaints of oppression from his
subjects, were sufficie~~t
reason for his recall, and Sa'id
b. 'Amr al-Harashi, a man of very different stamp, was
installed in his place. The transfer may be placed in
the late autumn of 103/721. The ncw governor's first
act was 1.0 summon the rebels to submit, but a large
number of nobles ancl merchants, with their retainers,
either fearing that they could expect no mercy, or anxious
t o free themselves altogether fro111 the Arab yoke, prepared to emigrate to Farghala. Ghlirak did his utmost
to persuade them to remain, but without effect ; their
absence would no doubt affect the revenues, and a certain
emphasis is laid OII the point in Tabari's account. Leaving
hostages behind, the malcontents nlarched towards
FarghBna and opened negotiations with the lciilg for the
occupation of 'Islm. The majority settled in the interval
a t Ichujanda, but other parties actually entered FarghZna,
and one body at least occupied a fortified position on the
Zarafshsn. Al-Harashi followed up his demands by
marching into Sughd and encamped near Dabfisia,
where he was with difficulty persuaded to stay until
sufficient contingents arrived. On advancing, h e was
met b y a messenger from the Icing of FarghBna, who,
outwardly professingto assist the Sughdians, had secretly
decided to rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs
against them. Al-Harashi eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the allegiance of
Ushrfisana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged
by their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or
to submit, decided to risk a siege in Ichujanda, trusting
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to the protection of the king of Fargh~na. ~~i
Sa'id set about the siege in earnest, and they realised
that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on
unexpectedly easy terms. Sa'id divided tlleln, placing
the nobles and merchants in a camp apart from
soldiers. By the execution of ThCbit, a noble from
Ishtilcllan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which
he massacred the nobles and the troops, sparing the
merchants, who nuinbered four hundred, only in order to
squeeze them of their wealth. Tabari's account very
thinly veils al-Harashi's responsibility for this wanton
act of atrocious cruelty, which could not fa11 to embitter
the feelings of the whole population of Transoxania.
It is curious that the Persian Tabari (Zotenberg IV. 268)
has an entirely different story, which is found in none of
the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped
eventually took refuge with the IChSqHn of the Turgesh,
wheie they formed a regiment (no doubt continually
recruited from new emigrants) which particularly distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs (3).
The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the
spring and summer of 722 (end of 103, beginning of 104),
though the chroilology here, and indeed for all this period,
is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of the fortresses
in Sughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series
of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the
effect of the news from Ichujanda in stiffening the
resistance to the Arabs. The first fortress to be attacked
was that of Abghar, in which a band of the emigrants
had settled. The attack was entrusted t o SnlaymBn
b. Abi's-Sari, with an army composed largely of native
levies from Bukhara, KhwXrizm, and Shfimsn, accompanied by their princes. SulayrnSn persuaded the
dihclzn to surrender, and sent him to al-Hamshi, who at
first treated him well in order to counteract the effect of
the massacre of Khujanda, but put him t o death after
recapturing Kish and RabinjBn. The most inaccessible
fortress and the crowning example of A l - H ~ r a s h ~ ' ~
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I,crfidy were left to the last. The dillqzn subuqri
ill the fortress of IIhuzar, to the south of
still llcld
Nnsaf ; unnble to take it by force, Al-Harashi sent
fi[usnl.h,l b. Al-Rhirrit, a personal friend of Subuqri,
to orfer llinl a parclon. On his surrender, he was sent to
ifcrv 1l11t to death, although the amnesty, it is said,
llad been confirmed by 'Onlar b. IIubayra.
The \\'llole of Sughd was t1111s once more in the hands
t]lc Arabs. The nearer districts, I<hwZrizm and Bukl~firci,
had remained loyal and the Oxus basin seems tohave
been unaffected. But to malte a solitude and call it
1,Pnce did not suit the aims of the Arab government
and Al-fkiraslii found that his " policy of thorough "
olily provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse for superseding hiin, During the winter, illerefore, he was replncctl by Muslim b. Sn'id al-I<il%bi,who, as the grandson
of t\slniii b. Zur'a, came of a house long familiar with
l<l~urBstin. Tlle clanger of the movement of revolt
slwearIing to the Irailians of KhurBs%nseems to have preoccupied tllc Arab government during all this period.
Sa'itl I<lludhayna had poisoned the too-influential
IlayylTu an-Nabali on suspicion of rousing the Persians
against tllc governnlent and that it was felt even in Basra
rn:iy bc see11 f r o n ~Ibn EIubayra's advice to his new
go\relno~.," Let your cha~nberlainbe one who can lnalte
peace with your inaw3li." Muslim, in fact, favoured
tllc Pcrsinns ancl did all in his power to appoint officials
acccptnble to thein, the Mazdean Bahrsm Sis, for example,
llcing appointed Marzuban of Mew (4). But all such
menStIlZS nrere nlercly palliatives and coulcl not materially
affect the growing discontent in Sugl~d and ~ u l c Il:il.iStfill.
nuring his first year of ofice it is recorded
(if tile nal.rative is not, as ~ e l ~ l l a u s ethinlts,
n
a duplicate
of the raid on FarghZna in the following year) that
iVruslirninarched across the river but was met and
hack illto I<lluras%n by a Turlcish army, narrowly
esca~)ingdisaster. I t is not improbable that the local
were again assisted by Tiilgesh on this occasion,

In the following year, however, before the close of 105,
a second expedition gained some success at Afsllina,
neat' Samarqand. Rileanwhile Hisll~in had succeeded
Yazid 11 as Caliph, and 'Omar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite
leallings were too pronouncec~, was recalled in favour
of Kh2lid b. 'Abdullah al-Qasri of Bajila. The tralsfer
toolr place most probably in March (724), though
another account places it some months later, iVIuslim
was now preparing an expedition into Parghala, but the
Yemcnite troops a t BalBh held back partly through
dislike of the campaign a11d doubtless expecting the
governor's recall. Nasr b. Sayyzr was sent with a
Mudarite force t o use compulsion ; the mutinous
Yemenites were defeated at Bartiqgn and unwilli~igly
joined the army. It is noteworthy that troops irom
ChaghBniBn fought alongside Nasr in this engagement.
Before leaving BukhZrS Musliuz learnecl that he was to be
superseded, at the same time receiving orders lo continue
his expedition. Four thousand Aedites, how eve^, took
the opportunity of withdrawing. The remainder,
accompanied by Sughdian levies, marched into FargllZ~la,
crossed the jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting
d o ~ nthe fruit trees and devastating the land. Here
news was brought that RhZqZn was advancing aeninst
them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a retreat. The
Arabic accounts grapllically clescribe the headlong flight
of the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages,
the next day they crossed the WBdi Sabiih, closely pursued
by the Tiirgesh : a detachment, largely cornposed of
mawzli, which encamped separately, was attaclced and
suffered heavy losses, the brother of Gllkrak being
alnongst the killed. After a further eight days' n-~arcll,
continually harassed by the light Turkish horse, they
were reduced t o burning all the baggage, to the value of a
million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes
following
day, they found the way barred by the forces of Sllzsh
alld Fargllaa, together with the Sughdians who had
escaped from Sa'id al-Harashi, but the desperate and
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thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Turgesh from behind,
cut tlleir way through. The rearguard lnade a stand,
but lost its cominander. At length the remnants of t h e
allny reached Icltujanda, where 'Abdur-RaJbmzn b.
Nutaym tool< coinmand on behalf of Asad b. 'Abdullah,
mlcl made good his retreat to Sarnarqand.
This disaster, which is known a s the " Day of Thirst,"
marks a period in the history of t h e Arab conquests. It
was practically the last aggressive expeditioil of t h e Arabs
illto Transoxania for fifteen years, but of much greater
i ~ n ~ o r t a n was
c e the blow which it struck at Arab prestige.
TIlc rales were reversed ; from now onwards the Arabs
found tl~einselveson the defensive and were gradually
ousted from aln~ostevery district across the Oxus. No
woncler, therefore, that the ineinory of the " Day of
l'l~irst" rankled even long after i t had been avenged
(5). Accordii~gto the Arab traclition, the Tiirgesh armies
were led olt this occasion not by Su-Lu himself, but b y
one of llis sons. Unfortunately t h e accounts of Su-Lu
in sucli Chinese worlts as have been translated are silent
on his Westcrn expeditions, and the Arab historians
arc our only authorities. The immediate result of the
Arab defeat, not o111yin Sughd b u t in TukhBristai and
the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude of
passive resistance to the Arabs t o the point a t which it
only ncecled active support to break into a general
conflagration. From this time, if not before, the subject
princes regarded the Turgesh as the agents of tlleir
deliveraice, coinmissioned by China in response t o the
urgent cntreaties they had addressed to the Emperor
for aid in their struggle. We find this actually expressed
in a letter sent three years later by the Jabgllu of Tukllzrista, whicl~is, in Chavannes' words " b u t one long
cry of distress" (6). "I am loaded with heavy taxation
by the Arabs ; in truth, their oppression and our misery
arc extreme. If I do not obtain the help of the (Chinese)
Ikan .
. my kingdom will certainIy be destroyed
alld dismembered .
, I have been told that the
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Celestial Icagan has given this order to the I<agau of the
Tiirgesh To you I delegate tlle affairs of the Far West ;
you must at once send soldiers to drive out the Arabs."
The point of view here expressed is of course that of the
ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of
their authority is understandable. Besides malting
alh'ance for some natural exaggeration, it would be
dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by
the people. In all probability, ii we may judge from
historical analogies, there was also a pro-Arab party in
Sogdiana, who felt that the best interests of the cot~ntry
lay, not in an opposition whose final issue could scarcely
be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters
as far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by alternately giving and refusing cooperation on its side, i t drove its supporters in the end to
make corn~noncause with its opponents.
But though the situation was steadily deteriorating
the decisive moment had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. 'Abdullah, seems to have seen something of
the danger though factional feeling was running so high
that the administration was almost helpless in face of it.
He tried to continue Muslim's policy of conciliatioll by
appointing agents of known probity. Tawba b. Abi
Usayd, a mawlE who had been intendant for Muslim, and
who " treated the people fairly, made himself easily
accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained
their supplies," he persuaded to remain in office under him.
1 ' b. HEni', tlie financial intendant at Samarqand,
was unpopular ; he was recalled and Al-Hasan b. Abi'l'Amarrala of Kinda, who was in sympathy wit11 the
mawai, appointed in his place. With him was associated
ThzMt Qu$na, who had been a leader of some repute
under Saiid Khudhayna, " gallant warrior, distingllislled poet, confidant of Yazid b. Muhallab,
universa]lJ~ popular " (7). Still more significant is the
fact that one of Asad's earliest actions was to renew the
practice, neglected since the days of 'Omar 11, of sending
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all elllbassy to the Chinese court. A s before, however,
tile Arabs resented the favour shown t o the Persians,
tile military wealcness of I b n Abi'l-'Anlarrata roused
tllel~lto open anger. Strong Turkish forces, probably
guerilla bands swollen by refugees and malcolltents froln
wasted districts, spread over the country and appeared
evcil beiore Samarqand. The governor made some show
of opl)osition, but avoided coming to grips with them,
tlius inter~sifyinghis unpopularity.
Sainarqa~ldindeed was gradually becoming more
more isolated, bot no assistance could b e given from
I{huriis%n. During his three years of office Asad's
attention was wholly engaged with t h e situation in
TuldlRristZn and the South. E v e n here his constant
expeditions, to Gharjisth, Ichuttal, and elsewhere, met
with 120 success. Worse still, in 1081726 he found his
forces in Ichuttal opposed by t h e IChBqSn with his
Tiirgcsll. The princes of Tulrharistan had taken t o
heaxt the lessons of the " Day of Thirst ",and the powerful
chief wl~ohad already all but drive11 the Arabs out of
Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the
Osus basin as well. Asacl visited his failure on the
Mudarites, whom he may have suspected of treachery,
but the indignation callecl out b y his treatment. of such
nlell a s Nasr b. Sayyar, 'Abdur-Rahmiin b. Nu'aym,
Sawra b. AI-Hurr, and Al-Balrhtari, made his recall
inevitable. Nor had his measures removed the distrust
ant1 hatred of tlie subject peoples. The land was wasted
a11d desolate (a), the crushing taxation was not lightened,
and all Persian governors were not of the s t a m p of Tawba ;
mally of tlxern were but too ready t o rival their Arab
rulers ingreecl and cruelty. Asad may have g a h e d the
irienckllip of many di11qLns (Q), b u t that was a n easier
matter tha~l to placate the population.
I n such a n
atmosphere it was only to be expected t h a t Shi'ite and
'Abbjsid propaganda, though actively combated b y the
administration, iound a fertile field among the &Iuslim
Converts in I ~ h ~ r Mand
n Lower T u k h ~ r i s t w and
,
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already beginning t o undermine the whole fabric of Arab
government.
For a momellt the Ilopes of a radical change of policy
entertained b y the maw317 a n d the clearer-sighted Arabs
were raised t o the highest pitch bytheappointlnellt (in 109)
of Ashras b. 'Abdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by the
separation of IChur%s&nfrom I<hKlid al-Qasri's province
of 'IrZq. It is unnecessary t o recapitulate here the farreaching concessions by which he hoped to secure, and
actually did for a t i m e secure the allegiance of the
Sughdians, or the methods by which the local princes,
especially Ghfirak, succeeded in checking the movement
(10). It is gellerally assumed that the hostility of Ghfirak
was due to the serious fall in revenue wliich would result.
Though this was doubtless the plea put fonvard and
accepted b y Ashras i t can scarcely have been the true
issue. Ghfiralr's aim w a s not to mainlaill himself on good
terms with the A r a b governors but to recover his
independence. If o n c e the people became " Arabs"
all hope of success m u s t have been lost. It was a game
with high stakes and Ghiirak won. It must not be overlooked, however, t h a t the account as we have it is
traditional and may often be mistaken 011 the sequence
of. cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the
measures adopted b y Ashras is more probably to be
explained by pressure from above, not from below, and
our tradition may really present only the popular view of
the Caliph Hisham's reorganizationof the financial admillistration (11). The Arabs resorted to brutal methods LO
wring the taxes f r o m the new converts, and with
incredible blindness selected the dihqgns for special
indignities, It is n o t unlikely that NarshaM~i's story
of the martyrdom of native Musli~nsin BulchZrB is connected with this event, though there are inany 0 t h
possible explanations, such as, for example, an attempted
Hzrithite movement (see below, p. 76f.) The reaction
swung the whole population of Tra~soxania,ai1lqgns
and peasalltry alike, into open rebellion. The first small
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party of cn~igmntswho quitted Samarqand, althougll
supllOrted by a iew Arabs, were induced to Surrender and
return (121, b11t witliin a lew months the dreaded IchZqxn
\"itl1 his 'firgesh had joined forces with the rebels and
swept tl,e Arabs acl.oss the Oxus. Eve11 Buktlara \\'as
lost (13) and only Samarqand with two minor Posts
on the ZarnfshLn, IIa~nnrjs and Dabiisia, held out.
Ghilrak, llo~vever, still supported the Arabs, as
Samarqand, althoiigh besieged, seems to have been in
no tlangcr, \\fhilc his so11 Mulchtgr, doubtless to keep a
footil~gin the opposite camp, joined with the Tiirgesh.
The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily ur~ited all parties and factions. The army was
concentrated a t Anlul but for three inonths was unable to
cross the rivcr in the face of the coinbilled native and
'l'iirgesli ar~nies. A small bocly under Qatan b . Qutayba
\\!l~icll11ad already crossed and fortified itself before the
arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The Turkish
cavalry even made raids 011 Khurassn with a n excess of
I~olclncsswhicll was punislled by a ~nountedforce under
TllXbit Qntna. At lengtli Ashras got his forces across
and, joining with Qatan b. Qutayba, advanced on
l'aykand. Tlic enemy cut off the water supply, and had
it not been for thc gallantry aild self-sacrifice of Hjritll
b.Surayj, Thdbit Qntna, and their conlpanions, an even
greater and more irretrievable " Day of Thirst " had
resulted. In spite of their wealcness, Qatan and the
cavil1r)rof Rays and Ta~nimcharged the enemy and forced
them back, so that Ashras was able to continue his
ntlvallce towards Bukh%r,i. In the heavy fighting the
Muslin1 forces were divided, Ashras and Qatan gave each
0 t h UP for lost, and Ghiirak jndged that the time had
come to tllrow in his lot with the T ~ ~ r k sTwo
.
days later,
ho\vever,
armies were reunited and on the retiral d
'rnrks encanlpecl a t Bawgdara outside tile walls of
Bnkhjl-a, \\,hence ihelr prepared to besiege the city.
Ghfirak also retrievecl his error and. rejoined ~
~
T1lc IcllB'lh inwithdrew towards Samarqand, but sat down
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before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storin in a few
days a t the most. The Arabic iiarratives of these events
are confused in several places, which has given rise to
many incorrect statements, such as that Ghiirak was
beleaguered with the Arabs in Icamarja and that tile
garrison consisted of Qatan and his forces. ICamarja was
not in thc neighbourhood of Payltancl, as Wellhausen
states, but a few farsalchs west of Samarqand (14). Wheil
the garrison would not yield to assauk IChBqiin tried
other methods. Accompanying his expedition was
I ~ h u s r Bthe son of Per62 and grandson of Yazdigird,
heir of the SHsXnid kings. This prince was sent to parley
with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration
of his lringdom allcl promised them an amnesty, it is not
surprising that the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him.
N o r would the appearance of a Sasznid prince cvolre
much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania.
As t h e SZsZnid house had talten refuge in Cllina, Ilowever,
the presence of Kliusrfi might be talcen as an indication
that the rebels were receiving encouragement from China
also, though the Chinese records are silent on this
expedition. ICh&qLn1ssecond proposal, that he should
hire the Arabs as mercenaxies, was rejected as derisively
as t h e first. The siege was then pressed with renewed
vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and hostages
to death, but after fifty-eight days ICliBqSn, on tlie advice
of the son of Ghiiralc and tlie other Sughdia~lpriuces,
allowed the garrison to transfer either to Samarqand or
Dabiisia. On their choosing the latter, the terms were
faithfully carried out after on exchange of host%=.
The fame of the defence of ICamarja spread far and
wide, but it brought little relief to the pressure on the
Arabs in Tralsoxania. Eve11 IChwHrizm was affected
by the movement of revolt, but at the iirst symptoms of
open rebellion it was crushcd by the local Muslims,
*robably Arabs settled in the district, wit11 the aid of a
force despatched by Ashras. The reference lnade in
7'abari to assistance given to the rebels by the Turlts is

ARAB CONQUESTSIN CENTRALASIA
12
probably to bc discounted, as is done b y Ibn al-Athir.
I t is of course quite possible that the moveilleilt was
illstigated by t l ~ eTiirgesh, though no such exl~lanation
is necessary, but if any Turlcs were engaged they were
probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems t o have
reinaincd before Bukhara during the winter, possibly
in Payltand ; the Tiigesh roba ably withdrew towards
ShPsli and Farghiina.
I n the following year, 130/111-112 (15),thc attacks on
the army of Ashras were renewed. The course of events
can only be gathered from the accounts given of the
difficulties experienced by the new governor, Junayd
al-Murri, in joining the army before
b. 'Abdur-Iialtm&~~
BukhBrB. Iiis guide advised him to levy a force from
Zanim and t l ~ eneighbouring districts before crossing the
Oxus but Junayd refused, only t o find himself after crossing put to ihe iiecessity of calling on Ashras for a bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster
on its way to meet Junayd and fought a second severe
engageineilt on the returli journey before reaching
Payltancl. The eneiny are variously described as " men
of BulthtirB and Sughd " and " Turlis and Sughdians " ;
it iliay therefore be assumed that they were t h e same
forces against whom llshras had fought the previo~is
year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that
Ashras was practically beleaguered, though not in
BukliBrZ. The recapture of this city and the retiral of
IClltiqPn took place shortly after Junayd's arrival, in
circumstances ~vhicli are not described (16). The
attitude of Tugsh%daduring this episode is not recorded.
It is practically certain, however, that he remained in
Bulch&r~%,
and after the reconquest was able to make his
pence with tlie Arabs, probably on the excuse of force
mrrjerrre. At all events lie retained his position, possibly
because Junayd thought it iinpolitic in the face of the
situation to victimise the nobles in the reconcluered
territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance
in the rest of the country. The Arabs seem t o have
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fol1owed up the Turks towards Samarqand, pl.obably to
relieve the garrison ; the two armies met again at
ZarmWJ1,seven farsakhs irotn S n n ~ a i - ~ a ~where
~ d , the
Arabs claimed a success, one of t~leirprisoners bcillg a
nephew of KhBqPn. From S11ghc1 the army lllarched
to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two moilths in the
friendly atmosphere of ChaghZni~nbefore retul1ling to
Merv. His intention was no doubt to malte arrangements
for the pacification or reconquest of Tultharistan and
Khuttal ; in the following year his troops were actually
engaged in this direciio~lwhen the Tiirgesh invasion of
Suglld forced hirn to change his plans. Balgdhuri
quotes Abfi 'Ubayda for the statement that Junayd
reconquered certain districts in T t ~ k l ~ x r i s invhich
ta
had
revolted.
How lightly even yet factional feeling was sluinbering
was shown after the return of the army, when the
Bghilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate on Nasr b.
Sayyzr for their discomfiture a t Bartiqa~. Though
Junayd was prompt t o pu~lishthe oifendir~ggovernor,
the incident throws a strong light on one cause of the
weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns.
Early in 7311112-113, the Tiirgesli and Suglidia~~s
gathered their forces for the investment of Sarnarqand.
Ghfirak now openly joined the IihBqLn. Sawra b.
Al-Hurr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the
enemy in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for
assistance. The governor hastily recalled his troops,
b u t crossed the river without waiting for t h a n against
the advice of his generals. "No governor of KhurZs~n,"
said al-Mujashshar b. MuzBlzim, one of the ablest of the
Arab commanders, " should cross the river wit11 less than
fifty thousand men." Accompanied only by a mall
force, Junayd reached Iiish, where he raised s a n e local
levies and prepared to march,on Samawand. The enelnY
in the meantime, after blocking up the water supplies
on his road, interposed their forces between Samarqand
and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon decided
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follow the direct route across the Sh%wd%rmountai~ls
in the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only
four farsalrlis from Sa~narqandwas surprised in. the
defiles by IZhBq3n. The advance-guard was driven in
and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which
both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in
on all sides, were forced to entrench ; stragglers, refugees,
and baggage, collected near IZish, were attacked by a
detachment of Tulks and 'severely handled. KhBqZn
renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but
overwhelming Junayd, and settled down thereafter to
beleaguer him. In this predicament there was only one
course open t o Junayd. Had his force perished, Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two
disasters taken the place of one. He therefore adopted
the more prudent, ii unheroic, course of ordering Sawra
to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and march out
to join him by way of the river : Sawra, however, took
the short cut across the mountains, and was actually
within four iniles of Junayd, when the Turltish forces
bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat of
the day, when the Turks, 011 Gl~iirak'sadvice it is said,
having first set the grass on fire, drew up so as t o shut
Savra off froin the water. Maddened by heat aid thirst,
the Arabs charged tlie enemy and broke their ranks,
only t o perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims
together. The scattered reinnants were pursued by the
Turkidl cavalry and of twelve thousand men scarcely
a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged with
Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position
in the defiles, though not without severe fighting, and
completed his march to Samarqand. Tabari gives also
a variant account of the " Battle of thepass," the main
difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the
side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into
TukhHristEn, it is improbable that the Jabghu, even if
he was present personally, which is doubtful, was
accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian Tabari
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also contains all ontirely difierent version of the Battle
of the Pass and the fate of Sawra. The original version
is amply attested by contemporary poets, who show
mercy t o Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained ill
this battle is reflected on Nasr b . Sayykr and the mawzli,
Junayd remained a t Samarqand for some time, recul,erating his forces, while couriers were sent to Hisham kt11 the
news of the disaster. The Caliph immediately ordered
twenty thousand reinforcements from Basra and &ifa
to be sent to XhurBsBn, together with a large number of
weapons and a draft on the treasn~y,at the same time
giving Junaycl a free hand in enlistment.
The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand,
withdrew t o BulchZra, wliere they laid siege to Qaian b.
Qutayba. Here they were also on the natural lines of
communication between Sarnxqand ancl Ifiurasau.
Junaycl held a council, and of three alternatives, either
t o remain in Samarqand and await reinforce~nents,or
to retire on IChurBsZn v i a Kish and Zarnrn, or to attack
the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the Arabs
was saclly shaken ; a garrison of eight hundred men for
Samarqand was scraped togetlier only by granting a
considerable increase in their pay, while the troops
openly regarded the decision to face I<hBqh inand the
Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting clestruction.
J~ulaydnow marched with the utmost circumspection,
however, and easily defeated a small body of the enemy
in a slrirmish near I<arrninia. The following :day
RhBqgn attacked his rearguard near TawZwis (on the
edge of the oasis of BulhBr.rB), but the attack had been
foreseen and was beaten off. As it was now well into
November, the Tiirgesh were compelled to withdraw
from Sogdiana, while Junayd entered B u ~ ~ L I ill
%
triumph on the festival of Mihrjln. In ChagllbiSn he
was joined by the reinforcements, I V ~ I O Ilie
~ sent 011 t o
Salnarqand, the remainder of the troops retullling to
their winter quarters.
Junayd seems to have been content wit11 saving

ARAB CONQUESTSI N CENTRAL
ASIA
70
Sanlarclaad ancl BukltRrB. As no further expeditions
are recorded of his two remaining years of office it lnust
be nssunicd that the situation in Sughcl remained ullcllanged and that the Tiirgesh irruptiolls also were
suspencled. Though tllc Arabs still held Samarqand
alicl ihe territories of BuJtharCi and I<ish, they were in all
probability confined to these, while in the southern basin
their authority hardly extenclecl beyoild Ballch and ChaghXi1iX11. Both sides inay have awaited the first move
by the other, but were surprised by thc appearance of a
new Iactor, wllicl~ threatened the existence of Arab
sovercigilty in the liar East more seriously than any
cxtcrnal danger. I t is note\vortliy illat in his last year
of office (115/733) Junayd resumed relations with the
Chinese court. Tlle Turltisll title of the leader of the
embassy, llo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the
ambassaclors were actually Arabs, but that the governor
had co~nmissioneclsome dignitaries from the subject
slates to represent the Arab government. ' The only
embassy recorded in this ycar from a native state, however, came fro111 I<huttal. I11 the sallle year KhurRsiin
was visited by a severe drought and famine, and to provide
for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered supplies
from all the surrounding districts. This, added t o . the
rnilita~y disasters of the last few years a n d the
insinuatiolls of Slli'ite propaganda, provolced open
discontent in the district which had hitherto bee11 outwardly faithful to itIerv, namely the principalities of
Lower Tukl~ZristSn. The leader of the malcontents was
Al-Hgrith b. Surayj, who was flogged in consequence
by the governor of Balkh. The discontent flared into
open revolt on the death of Junayd in Muharram 716
(Feb. 734). IlZrith, assisted b y the princes and people
of JUejSn, Fgrybb, and TSlaqSn, marched 011 Balkh and
captured it from Nasr b. Sayylr. The versions leave
it uncertain whether HBrith defeated Nasr and
the11 capturecl the city or whethcr he enterecl the city
first and beat off an attempt a t recapture by Nasr.
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(bellhausen's reference to the Oxus is due t o his so mis%derstanding the " river of Balk11 " ill Tab. 16GO. 2.
h a t it refers here, as freclueiltly, t o the Dehas river is
clear from t h e distance to the city (2 farsalrhs, whereas
the Oxus lay twelve farsaltlls from Ballth) as well as from
the mention of the bridge of 'Alii.) From Ballth he moved
against the new governor 'Asim b. 'Abdullah al-Hilai,
at Merv, capturing Merv-Rtdh on the way. 'Asim found
a large section of the inhabitants in league with Hzrith,
but on his threatening to evacuate Mcrv and to call for
Syrian troops, the local forces rallied round him. At
the first reverse, the princes of Lower TukhBristLn
deserted HBrith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to
three thousand. He was thus reduced to making terms
with 'Asim, but early in the following year renewed his
revolt. 'Asim, hearing that Asad b. 'Abdullah was on
the way a s his successor, began to intrigue with HBrith
against him. The plan miscarried, however ; IIBrith
seized the governor and held him to ransom, so that Asad
on his arrival found the rebels in possession of all Eastern
Rhuriis%n, and Merv threatened both from Cl~eEast and
from the South. Sending a force under 'Abdur RzthmBn
b. Nu'aym towards Merv Rildh to lteep H5rith's main
body in check, he marched himself against the rebel
Iorces at Anlul and Zamm. These took refuge in the
citadel of Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the
insurgents in this quarter, continued his march on Balkh.
Meanwhile HHrith seems to have retreated before ' AbdurR d z m ~ ntowards Balk11 and thence across the Oxus,
where he laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower Tulthikistiin
returned t o its allegiance; on the other hwld IIFILith
was now supported not only by the ltings of KIluttal
and Nasaf, but also; as appears from later events, by
the Jabghu of TukhkristBn. The government troops were
unable t o cross the Oxus in the face of HHrith's army ;
finding, however, that the garrison was well able to defend
,
fallillg
itself, they returned to Balkh, while H ~ r i t h after
out with theking of Khuttal, seems to have retired into

TulchZrist3n. I-Iere, iollowing the example of MfisZ
b. IChBzi~nat Tir~nidh,he made a safe retreat for l~imself
~~

~

in BadaltllshEn.
Tlic motives of Hgrith's rebellion have been most
variously estimated. In spite of the unctuous sentiments
whicll he is represented as uttering on d l occasions, it
is hard to find in him the " pious Muslim, ascetic and
reformer " whom van Vloten too sllarply contrasts with
tllc government officials (17). In spite too of the
prominent position given to him in the Arabic cl~ronicles,
it inay even be questioned whether he and his small
personal following were not rather the tools than the
leaders of the elements making for the overthrow of the
Uinayyad administration in I-ChurBsZn. At all events the
weak~iessof his hold over his temporary followers is
unuch more striking than his transient success. Further
evidelice oi this is given in a most important narrative
prefaced by Tabari to his account of Asad's expedition
illto Sugl~d. Except for the scantiest notices, the Arabic
historians have nothing to say regarding the effects of
tlle war in I<hurBsan on the situation in Transoxania.
Wellhausen's conclusion (based apparently on Tabari
1890. 6) that " H L i t l ~first unfurled the black flag in
Transoxai~ia in the last year of Junayd " is scarcely
tenable. There is further no evidence at all for his
assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands
of the Harithites, especially as Bulchara remained l o y a l t o
the administration. That Asad's expedition was not,
in fact, directed against WBrith follows in the clearest
possible manner from the narrative referred t o (Tab.
1685. 6-16),
"Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm,
and when he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-ShaybZni.
one of Hirith's follow~e~s,
who was in BBdhkar (the citadel of Zamm),
saying "That which yon have disowned in your own people is oniy
their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women . nor lo
the co)tgzrest by the unbelievers o/such as Samnrqamd. Now I a m on
my way to Samarqand and I take a n oath before God that no harm
shall befall you on my initiative, bnt you shaU have friendly and
,,
honour8ble treatment and pardon, you end those with you.

. .
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of ,x,rdol,

wllich he had givcn h i m , nrld Asad pnrdoa~edhim, olld ~ l . ~ ~ ~ ~ l l ~ ~ ~ ,
marched wit11 him to Samarqmd nncl Asad gave them dolllllu

,,;,,,."

The expeditioll therefore was obviously against 1111believers. That the whole of Sughd was lost to the Arabs
is clear from the fact that Asad found it necessary to take
provisions for thc army with him from Bulth%r,?. 1-lewas
not S ~ c c e s S f ~inl recapturing the city, however, and
attelnptecl no more than the damming of tlle calla1
sluices a t Waragl~sar.
The fate of the garrison of Sarnarqand has thus been
passed over in silence, unless, perllaps, it is hinted at in
Asad's reference t o the capture of bl~uslim rvomc~l.
Whether GhGrak recaptured it with his own troops or
with the aid of the Tiirgesll, it can scarcely be doubted
that he had taken advantage of the clissensio~lsin
IChurPsZn to realise his ainbition and at last drive thc
Arabs out of his capital. Of all the conqncsts of Q~~taylia
beyond the Oxus, Bul<h&r?t,ChZglianiln, aucl perhaps
IIish alone remained t o the Arabs. A co~~firnlatory
detail is the cessation of Sugl~dianembassics to Cl~i~la
between 731 and 740 : no\[? that independe~icc(eve11if
under Tiirgesh suzerainty) had been won agai~i,tllcrc was
no need to invoke Chinese support. Negativc c\,idence
of the sanle I h d is afforded by thc absence of any Arab
embassy during the same period. Had the Arabs been in
possession of Sughd, it is practically certain (bat Asacl,
as he had done before, wo~rldhavc renewer1 relatiol~swith
the Chinese court. Against this view may be set tlle
statement in Tab. 1613. 6 that IIliZqTil \was preparing an
army t o invest Samariqand a t the time of his assassination. This report is, however, fro111 its llature ulltnlstworthy, and is contradicted by the preseIlcc of the kink!
of Sughd wit11 Sughdian troops in tlle T~rgcsharmy in
119/737 as well as by Nasr b. SayyBr's expeditioll to
Snmarqand two years later. Snghd tllus elljoyed Oilcc
more a brief period of independence. 111
Or 738
Ghfirak died and his kingdom rvas divided amongst his

heirs. I-Ie was succeeded at Sainarqand by his son Tn-110
(? Tarlchfin), formerly prince of I<abudl~%n.Another
so11Me-chu'o (? MulchtDr) was already king of MXyainurgh,
while the king of Ishtikhan in 742 was a certain Ro-lopu-lo who may perhaps be identified with Ghfirak's
brother Afarfin (18).
The year after the campaigns against IIBrith, 1181736,
was devoted by Asad to the reorganisation of his province,
including a measure which, it seems, he had already
projected in his first tertn of office. This was the
removal of the provincial capital from hferv to Ballch
(19). Since no other governor of I<hurBsLn followed
his example we must seek the motive for the innovation
either in the contemporary situation in I<l~ur%s%n
and Trai~soxaniaor in Asad's personal views. Explanations based on the former are not hard to find. Asad,
o n taking office, had been faced with a serious situation
both in Lower TulchBristBn and across the river. H e
h a d obviously to establish a strong point d'afifzbi. The
loyalty of the garrison at Merv was not above suspicion
b u t the garrison a t Ballth was composed of Syrian troops,
who could be trusted to the uttermost (20). Merv was
also less convenient for reaching TukliBristBn, which was
at the moment the main area of operations. More
important still, perhaps, Balkh was the centre from which
all disturbances spread in Eastern I<hur%s%n,
as in the
revolt of NEzak and the recent atteinpt of HZrith. As
the holding of Balkh had enabled Qutayba to forestall
NBzalt, it is possible that Asad felt that in Balkh he would
b e in a position t o check all similar tnovements at the
beginning. Other considerations may also have disposed
h i m t o take this view. Balk11 was the traditional capital
a n d on it, as we have seen, was focussed the local sentiment of Eastern I<hurLs%n. Merv, on the other hand,
h a d always been the capital of the foreiguers, of the
Sassnians before the Arabs. Asad's personal friendship
with the dihqzns may have given him some insight into
t h e inoral effect w11icl1 would follow from the transference
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of the adnlinsitration to the centre of the national life.
Still greater would this effect be when the rebuilding was
carried out not by the Arabs themselves but by lllcir
people under the supervision of the Barinak, tile llere.
ditary priest-rulcr of the ancient shrine. (Suitc apart
from this, however, the rebuilding of Ballch was all event
of the greatest significance, and once restored it sooll
equalled, if it did not eclipse, its rival Merv in size and
importance. While the new city was being built, the
army was employed in expeditions into Tukli~ristSn,
for the most part under the command of Juday' alICaril~~
who
i , achieved somcsuccesses against thcfollowers
of HHrith and even succeeded in capturing their fortress
in BadalcshhBn. Other raids were undertal~ccn by t11c
goveillor himself, but without results of lnilita~y
importance.
Asad now planned a more ambitous expedition against
IChuttal, partly in retaliation for the assistance given to
HZritll, partly, it may be, to wipe OH an old score. The
chronology presents some ciifficdtics at this point.
Tabari relates two expeditions into I<hattal in thc salnc
year 119/737, both from the same source, but that wliicll is
undoubtedly the earlier is dated towards the closc of the
ycar (RomadZn = Septcnlber). Wellhausen avoids the
difficulty by referring this expedition to 118, reckolliling
back from the appointment of Nasr b. SayyPr, the data
for which are full and unimpeachable. This would scelll
the obvious solution were i t not that the datc given in
t h e Chinese records for the assassination of Su-Lu,
738 (RI),agrees perfectly with Tabari's dating of
Battle of Kharistsn in Dec. 737. The presence of Asad
on the secolld expedition would then liailg together wit11
the " somewllat legendary " nairativc of the hfihrjgn
feast. There seems reason, therefore, for dating this
expedition in 120/738 and rcgarcling i t as having been
despatched by Asad, though not actually a c c o m ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
by him, Tabari fortunately preserves also a sllort notice
the situation in Ichuttal. The heir of as-Saba',
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whose name is to be read as Al-Hanash, from the Chinese
transcription 1.0-kin-tsie (22), had fled t o China, possibly
on accou~~t
of factional distnrbances. On his deathbed
as-Sabal appointed a regent, Ibn As-Sg'iji, t o govern
the country until Al-Hanash could be restored. The
moment was certainly opportune for malting a n expedition and Asad at first carried all before him. On his first
appearance, however, Ibn As-SB'iji had appealed for aid
to Su-Lu, who was at his capital Nawgkath (on the Chu).
The ICl~aqZn,with a small mounted force including the
Sugltdian refugees, marched from StyZb (near Toltmak,
on the Clir~)to I<huttal in seventeen clays, only t o find
Asad, warned of his approach b y the regent, who was
endeavouiing to play both sides off against each other,
in precipitate retreat. The baggage train h a d been
despatched in advance under Ibr2him b . 'Asim with a
guard of Arabs and native troops from ChaghZnign but
the main body was overtaken b y the Turlts as i t was
crossing the river and suffered severe losses. Asad,
considering himself safe with the river between his army
and the enemy, encamped and sent orders to Ibrahim
to halt and entrench his position. The Turks, however,
were abIe to effect a crossing ; after an uilsuccessful
assault on Asad's camp, they hastelled t o overtake the
richer prize while tlie governor's troops were too worn out
to protect it. By sending a party under cover t o fall on
the troops of ChaghZni%nfrom the rear while h e himself
attaclted in front, the IChsqfm forced a n entrance into
IbrBhim's camp. Ch2ghBn Khudah, faithful to t h e Iast,
himself fell with the greater part of his forces b u t the
remainder of the garrison were saved b y the timely
arrival of Asad. According to the main account, the
Arabs were allowed to withdraw to Balkh without
further serious fighting. A variant account given b y
Tabari relates an uns~~ccessful
assault b y the Tiirgesh on
Asad's camp on the morning following the " Battle of
the Baggage," which happened to be t h e feast of Fitr
(1st October 737). On the retiral of the Arabs, the
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I c l l W n , instead of returning to his capital \\riCl1 tllc
Il0noul.s of the day, ren~ainedin TulthBrjstiin.
Here he was joined by IAiirith, who aclvised l i i l l l to
ulldertalte a winter raid into L o \ ~ e rT u l t l l ~ ~ \,,hilt
i~(~~~
the Arab troops were disbanded, undoubtctlly ill tllc
expectation that the local princes \vould again ullitc
with him against Asad. The governor rclaillcd ]lis a m y
at Balkh until the winter had set in, and in tllc ~ c a ~ ~ t i l ~ l c
the XhlqLn summoned forccs to join him from suglltl
and the territories subject to TultldristZn. T l ~ cnumcrae
tion which Tabari gives of the troops accompn~lyi~lg
tlrc
Ich%qLnon this expedition shows very clearly how c o w
pletely Arab rule in Transoxania and the Oxus basill
had been supplanted by that of the'rurlzs. We arc told
that besides thc ICh.?q5nPs own Turkish troops nlld
H l r i t h with his followers tllere were present the Jabgl~c~.
the king of Sughd, the prince of Usrilshana, and the rulers
of ShZsh and Rhuttal. It is fairly certain, of course,
that the list is exaggerated in so far ns the nctnnl prr!sc~lcc
of the princes is concerned (it is in iact partially ccnllmdicted in other parts of the narrative), l~clt it call
scarcely be doubted that forces from some, if not :dl, of
these principalities were engaged. 011the cvcning of
the 9th Dhu'l-Hijja (7th Dec.) news reached R:~llih tli:tt
the Tiirgesh with their auxiliaries, nunibcring sorlic 30,000,
were a t Jaaza. Asad orclel-ecl signal frcs to be lit t~ntl
with the Syrian garrison of Balkh and what other troops
h e could muster from the district n~arclleciout agai~lst
them. The governor of IChulm sent ill n second rc1)ol.t
that the Khfiqsn,
been repulsed in an attack On tllc
town, had marched on towards PBr6z i'J:~lih~l~B~.
ill the
neighbourhood of Balkh. From this point t l ~ ccllemIr,
avoiding Ball&, moved on JilzjZn and occtlpictl
capital (23). Illstead of continning his a d ~ ~ a n cilne
mediately, the I(hgq& halted here and Sent Oclt raidirlg
parties of cavalry in all directions, an action \llicll
' it
beyond doubt that theimmecliate object of the cxpeditio1l
was not the capture of Merv b u t tile rousing of 1..oWpr
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TnkhBristBn against the Arabs. Contrary to Hgrith's
expectations, however, the king of JfizjBn joined with the
Arabs, who marched towards Shubfirqgu by way of
Sidra and I<harist%i1. From the conflicting narratives
in Tabari, it seems that Asad surprised the I<hBqBn in
the neighbourhood of I<haristBn (or SBn) at a momeut
when his available forces amounted only to 4,000. A
furious struggle ensued, which was decided in favour of
the Arabs by an assault on the KhBq%nfrom the rear,
on the initiative of the king of JfizjBn. It is in connection
with the battle, which he describes as if it were a set
engagement in which the whole of the opposing forces
were engaged, that Tabari gives his list of the combatants.
Rut as only 4,000 out of the total of 30,000 troops with the
I<h%q%nwere involved, the list is obviously ont of place
and the whole narrative shows the marks of rehandling.
The Muslims gained an overwhelming success : the
Xh%q%lland Htrith, having narrowly escaped capture
in the confusion, were closely followed by Asad as far as
Jazza, when a storm of rain anrl snow prevented further
purs~lit. They were t l ~ n sable to regain the Jabghu in
TulthSristh, with happier fortune than the raiding
parties, whose retreat was cut off by the vigilance of AlKainlZni, and of whom only a single band of Sughdians
made goocl their escape.
On this sltirmish a t I<llarist%n,for it was little more,
hung the fate of Arab rule, not only in Transoxania, but
possibly even in I<hur%~n,a t least for the immediate
future. Though the princes of Lower Tulth%ristBn
fought for Asad in the first place, there can be little doubt
that a victory for Su-Lu would have swung them back to
the side of HBrith and the Turks, who would then have
been in aposition to follow up their attacks with the
advantage of a base a t Ballth, solidly supported by the
Oxus provinces. From such a danger the Arabs were
selection
saved only by Asad's resolution,and fort~u~ate
of Balk11 as his residence. The account given of H i s h a ' s
incredulity on hearing the report shows how very serious
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the outlook llacl been and the extent to which thename of
the IChEqhn had become an omen of disaster. I<llaristiln
was not only the turnilig point in the fortunes of the Arabs
in Central Asia, but gave the signal for the downfall of
the Tiirgesh power, which was bound up with the personal
prestige of Su-Lu. The princes of TulchlristLll and
Transoxailia fonncl it expedient to treat him with respect
as he was returning to NatvCltath, but in his own country
the dissellsions long fomented in secret by the Chinese
broke ant. Su-Lo was assassiilated by the Baga Tarlcha11 (RiirsEl) ; the ltingdom fell to pieces. " the Turlts
split up and began to raid one another," and the coup 118
g ~ l i c cof the Rhatlate was delivered at Sf~yiibin 730 by
the faction of ICiirsiil, supported by the Chinese and
with the assistance of Al-Ishkand and contingents from
ShEsh and Farghfina (24) (25). With the collapse of the
Tiirgesh kindgom disappeared the last great Turltish
confederation in Western Asia for inore than two
centuries to come. The battle of I(11aristEn assurecl
the supremacy of the Muslim civilisation ul Sogdiana, but
it coulld not have attained the richness of its full development tllerc unless all danger froin the steppes had been
removed. That this secnrity was attained was due not
to the Arabs, but to the Chinese diplomacy, wllich, by
brealcing clown the greatest external obstacle to the
Muha~ninadailpenetration ol Central Asia, brought itself
face to face with the Arabs. This could scarcely have
beet1 realised a t once, however, by the Arabgovernment,
whose immediate t-ask was to restore its lost authority
in Transoxania.
NOTES
I, As the history of this and tl~cfollorvingpcriodl~asbeen give11 in considerable
detail byWellhauscn (Arab. Rcich 280L)Irom the Arabpointof view', itis
intmtclcd irr those cllvplcrs to fallow only the sitltalian in '~rallsoxania
and tllc course of tlie Tilrgcsh conquests, avoiding as la1 0s possible a
simplo r e e a p i t l ~ ~ a t i01
~ nfnmilia~.matter. Thus little rcfcrcnee is Inado to
t h e frictional ~ t ~ i among
ic
tho Arabs, thougl~it natllrolly played a wry
inlpartant part it, limiting tl~cirpower to rlcal \vItll Lllw inrawntr.
2. See Chavnnncs. Documents 286, n. 3.

3. Cf. Tab. 11. 1718. 3 ff.
4. T a b . 1402, 11 ; cJ. 1088. lo. 1481 I.
6. T a b . 1000. LO.
0. Clmv. Doc. 200 I., 203 I.
7. V a n Vlotcn. La Domination Arabe 28.
8. T a b . 1633. 16.
0 T a b . 1601. 2.
10. W e l l i ~ a ~ ~ s284
c n f. : van Vloten 22 f. : Tab. 1601 1. : Waf.428 f.
11. Seo \\'clii~auscn 218.
I?. Tllc variant roadinns
- in T a b , 1600. 11. (.c.j , Ibn al-Atilir) make i l doubtful
whcthcr tile taxcs rvcre reilliposed on them or not.
13. T a b . 1611. 11.
14. See YSqOt S . V . : Barthold. Turlrcvtan 127 : and cf. Tab. 1623. 3. T h c chief
difficulty in Tabari's text is the abrupt changc a t t h e last word of I . 140"
p. 1610: thas~rniltahawwala (ashrashu) ilB marjin yuq5111 l a l m bawHdarntun Jn'nfdhwrrl sababatun
wallurn nuzOlun bikarnarjata. The
context Lhows that it was not to Ashras that SabSba came b u t t o tllc
garrison of ICnlnarja ~ v i t hthe news t h a t thc I<hBq&n was retiring past
t h e m (rnBrun bilo~ml.
16. T h o chronological dillictu'lties are explained by Wellha~lscn286 ff. T h e y are
o f smilli irnuortancc I~o\vever,and it seems erelerable to follow h i s dates
ior t l ~ w ccampaigns.
Cf,Tab. 1628. D. with 1620. 6 f. 141.
280 ff, (cJ, 302 f.). Another account u l
V a n Viotc", o p . cit. 20 11. : Wclll~al~sen
Hiritll is given by Gvrdlri ap. Ilarthold Turkcstan. T e x t s pp. 1-2.
in. Cbnv. Doc. 210, 130. 140 ; Barthold, Arab, Qucilen 21, n. 8.
10. T a b . 1400, 1601. 18 : U'ellhausen 202 a n d 284 n. : Barthold in Zcitscl~rilt
f u r Assgriolagie XXVI (1011) 201.
Tub. 1600, 6. Tllefe does not seem t o be any record of when t h e s e Syrinns
\\,ere acttlcd a t Balkh.
Wieger 1043 : Chav. Doc. 284 f.
Chav. Doc. 108.
As JOzjiin is distinguished from SltabOrqZn in T5b. 1608. 17. i t i s p m b a b l c
t h a t this was ihc town I<undnrm or QurzLnlin mcntiancd in Ya'qilbi's
Geog. 287.
Tab. 1013 : Ci~av.Doc. 83 f., 122 n. As regards thc adjective I a ~ a r l u k h i
applied to the Jabgllu in 1012. 10, t h e m a t satisIadory expianation is
t h a t given by Marquart. Hist. Glossen 183 1.
Tllc f q u c n t relercnccs in the Chineso minais to the association of Se-irin-L'i.
king of I<ish, with the Tilrgesh raise nn interesting problem. Tllerc can
b c no doubt that hc is tllc stma prince as Al-Lhkand, ruler of Nasaf,
in the Alabic records. The name is I r a n i ~ nand personal, not dynastic.
(Sec Juati's Iranisclles Namenbnch), Al-Ishknod i s first mentioned in t h e
account 01 the BaLtle 01 t h e Pass, (Tab. 1612. 8) where h c nppcar3 in camruaad 01 a cavalry lorce on the side of the I<hBqBn, tltough Kish a n d
Nasof were both in the hands of the Arabs (1646. 1). The forces ~vhiclt
11s colnmanded were tllemforc not t h e ordinary local troops. During
HBrith's siegc 01 Titinid11 he received reinforcements from Al-Lhl<8nd,
b u t no statement is made on the compcsition a1 his farces. Ho i s

...

mclrtioned again as accompanying thc I<hlqla and the Sughdiass in t h e
attaclr on Asad boforc the "Rattle a1 the Baggage" (1607. 17-18, rvlterc
the loading 'Ispahbadh of NasS' is probably a n error in the tradition.
Again tllere can be no question here of local troops from Nasuf or I<isb. I n
the Chincscreeordr Sc-ldu-l'i appears as thecommandcr of an indcpondsnt
iorce, not znerelv a detaclzrnent of T u r h or levies from SllPsli o r I i a r ~ h l n a .
The rrrost rcasonnblo conelusion is that Al-Irlrkand rvos t h e commander
of the carps 01 Stlghdian reluKees. This ivould explain tlre title " King of
thq,warr&rs "by which he isson~ctimes "lention& in tlie Cltinesc records
(Chav. Doc. 147 n. 1 and 313). Thc actual Lorm (Chikar) from xvhich
the title was derived docs not appoar in t h e Arabic histodcs in this connection, but it is perhaps possiblc that a variant of the nanlo (dcrivcd
from 111~tn)is to be read in Tab. 1014. 2 for thc meaningless " rardbin &IItissi." In 1000. 16 a force of " Bgbiya " i s mentioned along with tllc
Sughdiaus, and tltc name, though unrecognisablc, probably relrrs to some
forces connected u.Ith Sugld. Wollhausen's conchlsion t h a t the Suglldlans and " Bibiyr" formed part of the personnl following of fignth Ir.
Sumyj seems to form the counection i n the tost t m k r (hamala ' 1 - h ~ l l h o
lvamnn ma'nltu rnin alili's.suglldi wal-blbiyati). On the other h m d ,
since el-Ishkand appears as t l ally
~ of Haritll, w e m a y mncludc t h a t
some understanding crirted botlveeu the lattcr and the Soglldinns (and
titerelore tho Turlcs) a t the time of his revolt. It is probable that tho
Sughdian corps assisted in the recovery of Samarqand from tho Arabs.
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V. TI-IE RECONQUEST OF TRANSOXANIA.

THE reaction produced by the do\vnfall of the Tiirgesh
power was manifested in Transoxania in the first place
by an increased regard for China. The princes had f o u n d
the Tiirgesh yoke no less galling in the end than t h a t of
the Arabs (1); the country was as wasted and impoverished by their continual raids as it had been u n d e r
the latter. Tlle profitable native and transit trade, the
source of the entire wealth of the cities, must have shrunk
to ilegligible proportions if it bad not wholly ceased.
All classes of the people therefore were weary of war a n d
s o u ~ h tonly a peace consonant with their self-respect.
For the attainment of these aims it was vain to look to
China ; the granting of bombastic titles to a few princes
brought neither comfort nor aid. A final opportunity
was thus offered to wise statesillanship to swing the whole
country round to the Arabs almost without a blow.
For two years, however, the situation seemed to remain
much as it was, except for an expedition into IChuttal,
probably on the pretext of assisting the ruling house
against a usurper from BamiyZn. Nevertheless s o m e
progress had been made by the administration in regaining
the prestige it had lost. This was due not n~erelyt o t h e
effect of the victories over HZrith and the Tiirgesh, b u t
even inore to Asad's personal relations with the dihqzns.
He had, as we have seen, gratified the ilatiol~alp r i d e
of the people of TulchBrist2.n by transferring the s e a t of
power from Merv, the capital of the foreigners, to Ballch,
the centre of their national life. As had been the case
eve11 in liis first term of office, he was able to attract to
his side many of the more influential elcmellts in Lower
Tultl~Bristaand the Ephthalite lands-to this, in f a c t ,
was largely clue his success in the struggle wit11 the Turks.
More striking evidence still is afforded by the conversion
88
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of the dihqsns at this period, arnongst the111 tile Inillor
chief SamZn-I<hudah and probably also tile Barmak,
BY this means Asad laid the foundatiolls for a trlle
recollciliation ancl Narshalthi's work amply attests tile
honour which later generations attached to llis name.
His atorlr was of course incompicte in that it was practically confinecl to the rulillg classes and naturally <lid ,lob
extend to the now independalt dihqtins of Sughd.
Early in 120/738Asad died, and after a lapse of sonle
months the govemorsl~il~
was conferred by I-Iisl~snlon
Nasr b. SayyrZr. For the subject pcol~lesI I ~choice
could have been Inore opportullely made. Nasr was
one of the few Inen who had come with honour and
reputation il~rougll thc external and internal conflicts
of the last thirty years. Belonging to the small and
allnost neutral tribe of ICinZna, his posilio~lbore a strong
similarity to that d Qutayba in that both wcrc more
dependent on the support of a powerful patroll t11an on
their tribal connexions, and tl~erefore,tllougli [:rvouri~~g
Qays, less frantically partisan. In contrast to Qu~taybn,
however, Nassr, after thirty years of nctivc lcadcr,,
ship, knew the situation in 1<11urEsS11,Im~lsoxarlia,
and Central Asia as no Arab governor 11nd cver ctonc.
He had seen the futility of tlying to hold tile coul~try
by mere brute force, and the equal futility 01 tryirlg to
dispense with force. While he llelcl L11e support of
Hishgm, therefore, he set himself to restorc Arab aull~ority
in Transoxania. The al>pointment of (?aim b. @taJ'ba.
wllo had inherited I I ~ U C of
~ his fatiler's abilily, to
command the forces beyond the river gaVC carllcst
of a n aggressive policy. The appointment
llot to
Samarqand, as Wellhausen saJlS, but " over S"ghd~"
i,e., the garrisons in BultharS and probably Kisll, who \"ere
respoI~~ible
ill the first place .for keeping the surro'lndjng
districts in subjection. The governor hirnsclf the11 am^^^^
out a brief
intended apparcn t l ~ PL"'~~"
some rebels in the ~ l e i g h b o u r h ~of
~ d the Iroll
1-laving
thus
possibly in ~
l
~
~villdicated
~ tile ~

,
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authority of t h e administration, Nasr returned to Merv
and delivered the farnons Ichutba in which the system of
taxation and conditions of amnesty were at last laid down
in a korm satisfactory to the n~awiiliand the subject
peoples (2). Thc iesults were as lie had foreseen. The
princes and people of Transoxania submitted, as far as
we call j judge, without opposition when Nasr with his army
inarched through Sughd to re-establish the Arab garrison
and administratio~lin Samarqand.
This expedition may in all probability be dated in
121/739. A year or two later, Nasr collected his forces,
whicli included levies from Transoxania, for an attack
on ShHsli. Wellha~~senconsiders that the first two
expeditions were only stages of the third, but the
expedition to ShLsh can hardly have talten place earlier
than 122/740, in view of the fact that the annies of ShHsh
ancl F a r g h b a were engaged with the Tiirgesh in 739,
and of Narshalhi's statement (3),which there is no reason
to dispute, that Tughshada was assassinated in the thirtysccond year of his reign. Recltoning in lunar years this
gives 122 (91-122), in solar years 123 (710-741), as the
date. This is confirmed by the Chinese record of an
embassy from ShSsh in 741 complaining that " Now
that the Turlts have become subject to China, it is only
the Arabs that are a curse to the I<ingdoms" (4). 123 is
also the date given for the return of the Sughdians (5).
It is most unliltely that the intervening year or years
passed without expeditions altogether, and the most
reasonable supposition is that they were occupied in the
pacification of Sughd. The expedition marched easiward through Ushrnsana. whose prince, as usual, paid
his allegiance to t h e victor on his passage, but on reaching
the Jaxartes Nasr found his crossing opposed by the army
of ShLsh, together with Hgrith b. Surayj and some
T ~ ~ r l t i stroops.
h
I t would seem that he was unable t o
come t o blows with the main body of the enemy, but
made a treaty with the king by which the latter agreed
to accept an Arab resident and to expel H&rith, who was
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accordingl~deported to FBrab. As ~ ~ s u alater.
l , tradition
magnified the exl~loitsof the Aral~sby ccretlikillgNnsr
with the capture aid execution of I<iirsfil, tllc ,riirgcsIl
leader who had been scarcely less redoubtable than tilc
IChaqBn himself. If the story has ally fountlatioll it is
probably a legendary dcvclopmcnt from the caplure
of a Turkisll chief Al-Akhran~,related by Tabari in a
variant account. The presence of ICiwsgl wit11 a Tiirgcsll
force on this occasion is not in itself impossible, but if his
identification wit11 Baga Tarld~anis sound, we lcnorv that
he was executed by the Chinese in 744/126 (0). The
expulsio~lof H ~ r i t hwas probably the object lor wliicl~the
expedition had been undertaken ; before returning,
however, the Arabs entered Parghiina and pursued its
king as fal. as Quba before bringing llirn to tcrrns. Tl~e
negotiations were carried out l~etween Sulayn~an b.
SB1, one of the princes of JUrjBn, and i l ~ cQueen-hlotl~er.
This invasion of Farghana is related in il~rce(01. four)
different versions, some of which may possibly rcfcs to n
second expedition mentioned by ?'al,ari latcr. 111 thc
same year, on returning fsom thc exl~editionto Shiisll,
Nasr was met a t Samarqand by the Bukl13r IihutlR11
Tughshada and two of his dihqlns. T i c nobles laid a
complaint against the prince, but as Nasr seemed intlisposed to rearess their grievance, thcy aktenll~tctlto
assassinate both the Bul<ltgr I(l~uddl ant1 illc i h b
intendant a t Bukhbrii, WWsil b. 'Amr. Tl~e forrucr
was mortally wounded, and succeeded by his sot1 yuta~ba,
so named in honour of the conqlleror. The illci(l(:nt is
related also by Narshakhi with some additio~laldetails
which profess t o
the assnssinatioil. The t\''o
narratives present such a remarkablc si~niiarityof p[lruc,
llowever, even though tliey are in different l ~ ~ W " c s ~
that it is rathe]. more likely that t l ~ ePersian \'el.;ion has
elaborated the story than that 2'abari dclibcr;~t~ly
suDDrRssed anv offensive statemnlts, as W9"W
~ f o i e n(7).
Except for a possible second expeditio~~
to l:argllaa,
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no other campaigns into Transoxania are recorded of
Nasr, unless Balzdhuri's tradition (from Abii 'Ubayda)
of an unsuccessful attaclc on Ushrfisana refers to a
separate expedition. This is unlikely, and the account
conflicts with that given in Tabari. Ushrfisana, however,
was never really subdued until nearly a century later.
TukhZristh~,if it llad not already been recovered by
Asad, may have made submission of its own accord.
Since the defeat of the Tiirgesh and the flight of HBrith
it llad ceased to hold any inenace to the Arabs, and Nasr
llad accordingly retrailsferred the capital to Merv oil his
appointment.
The governor now tunled his attention to restoring
the prosperity of tlle country and developing a policy
of co-operation with the subject peoples. Nasr was the
first Arab ruler of Transoxania to realise that the goverilment depended for support in the last resort on the
middle classes and agriculturalists. Both these classes
were of greater political importance perhaps in Transoxania, with its centuries of mercantile tradition, than
any other were in the Empire.
I t was in the same
way that in later years the Tahirids and SBmSnids
established their ascendancy (8). He was thus able not
only to complete the work begun by Asad b. 'Abdullah,
but to settle it on more stable foundations. Shortly
after his recapt~ireof Sanlarqand he had sent an embassy
to China. This was followed up in 1261744 by a much
more elaborate embassy, obviously intended to regulate
commercial relations in the most complete manner
possible, in which the Arabs were accompanied by
ambassadors not only from the Sogdian cities and
'Tulch%ristZn,but even from ZBbulistZ~~,
Shzsll, and the
Turgesh. Two other Arab embassies are also recorded
in 745 and 747. There can be no doubt that it was not
so nlucll the justice of Nasr's rule as his personal influence
and honesty that reconciled the peoples of Transoxania.
Even the Sughdian refugees, stranded after the dissolution of the Turgesh confederacy, trusted him to honour
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the conditions upon wliich they had agreed to return,
and were not deceived although his concessions raised
a storm of protest, and thc Caliph himself was brought
to confirm them only for the sake of restoring peace,
I t is not surprising, however, that the princes were
dissatisfied with the success which had attended the
pacification of Transoxania. The people were " becoming Arabs " too rapidly and their own authority was
menaced in consequence. They were still hopeful of
regaining their independence, especially when Nasr's
position became less secure after the death of HishBm.
We hear therefore of sporadic embassies to China, such
as Chat sent from Ishtikhan in 745 aslting for annexation
to China " likc a little circumscription." That the
governor was aware of this undercurrent may be judged
from the fact that he felt it necessaly to have Harith b.
Surayj pardoned, in case he should again bring in the
Turks to attack the government (9). But the people as
a whole held for Nasr. The respect and even affection
which he inspired held all Transoxania true to him
during the last troubled years. No tribute could be more
eloquent than the facts that not a single city in Transoxania took advantage of the revolutionary movements
in Khurasal to withdraw its allegiance, that Aba Muslim's
~nissionarieswent no further than the Arab colonies at
Amul, Bukhara, and I<hwBrizm, and that the loyal
garrison of Balkh found first support and then refuge in
Cl~aghEnib and TukhZristBn. On . these facts the
various authorities whose narratives are related by
Tabari completely agree, and by their agreement disprove
the exaggerated account given by Dinawari (359 f . ) that
" Abii Muslim sent his envoys (du'8t) to all quarters of
KhurHsb, and the people rallied en mnsse to Abfi Muslim
from RerEt, Biishanj, hierv-Rfidh, TslaqEn, Merv, Nas%
Abiward, Tfis, Naysxbcr, Saralhs, Balkh, ChaghHnib,
Tultllgrist&n, KhuttalB11, Kish, and Nasaf." Dinawari
llimself states a little later that Samarqalld joined Abfi
Muslim. only after the death of Nasr. Aba Muslim's
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main strength, in fact, was drawn froin Lower TukhBrist5n and the neigl~bourlioodof Mcrv-Riiclh, several of the
princes of which, including the ruler of Bfishanj and
IIhalid b. Barmak, cleclared for him. But even here the
people were not solidly against the administration.
We are told that a camp was established at Jiranj
(south of Merv) " t o cut off the reinforcements of Nasr
b. Sayyar from Merv-Rtidh, Balkh, and the districts of
(Lower) TukhBristZn." Herat fell to Abfi Musliin
by force of arms. The Syrian garrison of Balkh, together
with the Mudarite party, were supported by the rulers
of both Upper and Lower Tukhtirist~n,and twice recaptured the city froin their stronghold at Tirmidh.
An example of Abti Muslim's efforts to gain over the
Iraniails is affordcd by an incident when, having taken
300 KhwZrizmian prisoners in an engagement, he
treated them well and set them free (10).
The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for
Abii Muslim is true only of the period after his success.
In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass
movement such as has so often been portrayed. His
following was at first comparatively so small that had the
Arabs been more willing to support Nasr at the outset,
it is practically certain that it would have melted away as
rapidly as the following of Hiirith b. Surayj at the first
reverse. " Nothing succeeds like success," and Abfi
Muslim, once victorious on so imposing a scale, and that
with the aid of Iranians, became a heroic figure among
the peoples of Eastern IChur%sZn. The legend penetrated
but slowly into Transoxania. When by 1301748,however,
the whole of Eastern IIhurZs%nhad fallen to Abfi Muslim
and Nasr no longer held authority, his governors in
Transoxania were replaced by the nominees of Abfi
Muslim without outward disturbance. But the recrudescence of embassies to China shows that under the
surface currents were stirring. Shgsh had already
thrown off its allegiance and the Sogdian princes had by
no means lost all hope of regaining independence in
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spite of the tranquillity of the last few years. As it
happened, however, the first revolt was not on their part
but b y the Arab garrison of Bultli%rBunder Sliarilt b.
ShayIch in 133/760-751. The rising, which was due to
their resentment a t the seizure of the Calipliate by tlic
'Abb5sids and the passing over of the 'Alid house, Fvas
suppressed with some difficulty by Abil Muslim's lieutenant Ziysd b. Sslih assisted by the BukhBr I<hud%li.
The fact that the BulthBr-I<hud~11assisted tlie troops of
AbCi Muslim against Sharik might be regarded as an
indication that he belonged to the party of the former,
This inference is more than doubtf111, however. Of the
30,000 men, who, we are told, joined the rebels, probably
the greater part were the townsmen, or " popular party,"
of BulrhBr5. The revolt thus assumecl tlie domestic
character of a movement against the aristocratic party,
who, lecl by the BulthBr-IThnd%h,naturally co-operated
with t h e Government in its suppression. The events
of the following year are sufficient evidence against any
other explanation. According t o Narslialtl~i,who gives
by f a r the fullest account of this revolt, Ziyad hacl also
t o suppress a similar movement in San~arqa~ld.In
the s a m e year an expedition was sent into IChuttal by
Abfi Di%~vud,the governor of Balkh, Al-FImash at
first offered no opposition ; later in the campaign he
attempted t o hold out against the Arabs but was forced to
fly t o t h e Turlts and thence to China where lie was given
the title of Jabghu in recompense for his resistance (11).
By this expedition I<l~uttalwas effectively annexed t o the
Arab government for the first time.
Of much greater, and indeed decisive, importailce were
the results of an expedition under ZiyXd 11. S~lihinto the
TurBisli lands beyond the Jaxartes. I t is surprising to
find no reference t o this either in Tabari or any other
of t h e early historians. A short notice is given by Ibn
al-Athir, drawn from some source which isnow apparently
lost. The earliest reference which we iiad in the Arabic
histories seems t o be a passing mention of
b.
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Siili1~'sexpedition " into Sin" in a monograpli on 13;c!:h
diid by Ibn Tayffir (d. 260/983) (12). For a ilcI:ti~~-l
account of the battle we are therefore depenclent trn t l ~ t t
Chinese sources (13). In 747 and 749 the Jal1gl~11
Tukh%rist?in liad appealed to China for aid ;1g:ri1151
certain petty chiefs whowere giving trouble in the Gilgllit
and Chitral valleys. The goveinor of Kucha d e s p a l ~ r l ~ ~ + l
on this duty a Coreau officer, Iho-hsien-shill, \ r l ~ c ~
punished the offenders in a series of amazing camp;ri::~~r
over the high passes of the Karalcorum. Before rctur~~in::
to ICucha after the last campaign he was called in I)!. t 1 1 t t
Icing of Fargllana to assist him against the kil~go f
ShBsh. Kao-hsien-shih at first came to termswith tlltnlii~~~
of ShBsh but when on some pretext he brolce his wort1 i i l ~ l l
seizecl the city, the heir to the kingdom fled to Suglitl I I I ~
assistance and persuaded AbC Muslim to intcrvv~~r..
A strong force was accordingly despatched under %i\.;icl
b. Salih. The Chinese, with the army of Farghiinn arrr1'tlic.
Icarluks (who hacl succeeded the Tiirgesh in t11c l t t y t ,
mony of the Western Turks), gave battle a t A t l ~ l ; ~ k l ~ ,
near Tariiz, in July 751 (Dhu'l-hijja 133). Durir~gthtr
engagement the ICarluks deserted and Kao-hsicn-sl~ih.
caught between them and the Arabs, suffered a crusl~il~g
defeat. Though this battle marlcs the end of C ~ I ~ I I ( Y H
power in the West, it was in consequence of intc.rl~:~I
disruption rather than external pressure. Nothing W;IS
further at first from the minds of the princes of Suglitl t11;cu
the passing of the long tradition of Chinese soverciglity.
indeed it blazed up inore strongly than ever. For 11:ctl
not a Chinese arnly actually visited Shash on their v c ~ y
borders ; even if the Arabs had won the first battle, \voul;l
they not return to avenge the defeat ? For the last
time the Shao-wu princes planned a concerted r i s i ~ ~ing
BulzhBrH, Iiish, Sughd, and Ushrfisana. But China gave
neither aid nor encouragement ; the presence of r\ba
Muslim at Samarqand overawed the Sughdians, and only
at Kish did the revolt assume serious proportions. i\b?~
DXwud's army easily crushed the insurgents in a pitched
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battle a t Kandak, near ICish, killing the icing Al-I];hrid
and many of the ottler dihq&ns. Aniougst the treasllres
of the royal palace which were sent to Samarcpnd
" m a l y articles of rarc Chinese worl<ma~ls]~i~,,
\resscls
inlaid with gold, saddles, brocades, and other objects
d'art." The BulthPr-IChudZh Qutayba and the dihqalls
of Sughd also paid for their colnplicity wit11 their
lives (14).
So ended the last attempt at restori~igan indcpendei~t
Sogdiana nnder the old 16gime. For some years yct tile
priilces of Sughd, Khwiirizm, and l'slclliiristiin contin~l~tl
to send appeals t o China. Thc Emperor, iio~vcver,
' preoccopied with maintaining peace, praised thcln all
and gave them consolation, then having wanled them sent
them back to assure tranquillity in the Wcste1.11la~itls."
Abii fi1uslim had also, it would seem, realisetl the
importaiice of inaintaiuiog relations with t l ~ eCl~iiiesc
court, for a succession of e~l~bassies
from " the hra~bs
with blaclc garments " is reported, beginning in tlie ycar
following the battle of the Talas. As many as tliret: arc
mentioned in a single ycar. I t is possil~le that tl~ese
embassies were in part intended t o keep the go~rc.rr~~~ic.nt
informed on the progress of the civil wars i l l CLlil~n,
though the active interest of the new aclmi~lislratiol~
in
their cominerce would, as before, tend to reconcile t l ~ c
influential mercantile co~nniunitiesto 'Abbiisid rulc. T~IC
actual deathblow to Lhe tradition of Cliinesc o~~erlorclsl~ip
in Western Central Asia was given, not by ally sllch
isolated incident as the battle of the Talas, but by the
participation of Central Asian co~~tit~gcnts
in the
restoration of the Emperor to his capital in 757 ,715).
Men from the distant lands to whom China llnd seemed
an immeasurably powerful and ~mconquel.ableEmpire
now saw with their ovn eyes the fatal wealcllcsses that
chinese diplomacy had so.slcilfully concealed.
this
blow Chinese prestige never recoverccl.
sl~attering of the Wcsterll Turkish
~h~
empires by the Chinese policy l ~ a dalso pllt an entl to all
I
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possibility of intervention from that side. Transoxailia,
therefore, was unable to look for outside support, while
the reorganization of the Muslim Empire by the early
'AbbHsid Caliphs prevented, not indeed sporadic though
sometimes serious risings, but any repetition of the
concerted efforts at national independence. The Shaowu princes and the more important dihqzns continued to
exercise a nominal rule until the advent of the S%mZnicls,
but many of them fo~undthat the new policy of the Empire
offered them an opportunity of honourable and lucrative
service in its behalf and were quick to talte advantage of
it. On the other hancl the frequent revolts in Eastern
IChurBsBn under the guise of religious movements show
that the mass of the people remained unalterably hostile
to their conquerors (16). In none of these, however, was
the whole of Transoxania involved until the rising
organized by RBfi' b. Layth three years after the fall of
the Barmaltids. The extraordinary success of his
movement may partly be ascribecl to resentment at their
disgrace, but it perhaps counted for something that he
was the grandson of Nasr b. SayyBr. Though the revolt
failed it led directly to the only solution by which Transoxania could ever become reconciled to inclusion in the
Empire of the 'AbbBsids. Whether by wise judgment
or happy chance, to Ma'mGn belongs the credit of laying
the foundations of the brilliant Muhammadan civilisation which the Iranian peoples of CentraI Asia were to
enjoy under the rule of a dynasty of their own race.
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NOTES
1.

Cf. Tabari 1694. 14 : 1013. 3 : Chavannes. Doc~~lnents
142.

2.

The details oi this measure are discussed by Wellhauscn, Das Arabische
Reich 297 ff., and van Vlotcn. Domination Arabe 71 1. Note Lhat Tab.
1680. 6 expressly reieax to them as "conditions of peace.''
NarshakhI 8. 18.
Chav.. Doc. 142.
Tab. 1717 f ,
Chnv., Doc. 280.
Iran Irioten, a$. cil. 20. Cf. 8 . f . Tnb. 1004.1 with Narslr. 00. 3-5.
Barthold. T~rrkcstnn218.

3.
4.
6.
0.
7.
8.

THERECONQUEST
OF TRANSOXANIA 913
Tab. 1801.
T a b . 1060. 11; 1SUO. 10 ; 1007fl. (tllis passagoisunlortannloly dcfcctivcnnd
has been supplo~iienledby thc crlitor from lbn al-Alhir) ; 1010. 0. The
popularity of Nasr is dcnlonrtratorl also by t h e gro\~th01 a tradition coulld
his nome. This appears io Tabaui sornewhut unoblr~tsivelyin isolated
passages, u~lforturlatcly rvltho!!t quotalion 01 hluds'ini's ahllllorilicr.
According ta tho " Fibrirt " (103.12) nlad8'ini wrotc iwo booLs 01) tile
administrations of Asad b. 'Abduliah and Narl. b. Sayyjr, a fact whicll
confirmsthe special lmportnr~ccoi tl~csetwo iovcrnors in the history u l
IChurBBn. Probably Asad was luoro popular with tho dihqzns asd
Narr wit11 tho people.
~ h a v . Doc.
,
108 : cf. hlarquart. Br5nellahr 303.
ICitlb BaghdZd, Band VI cd. 1-1, I<ctler, p. 8. 12.
Chav.. Doc. 207 1. ; Wieger, Toxtes Historiq~ncs1047.
Tab. 111. 70 f.: Narsh. 8 fin. : Chav., Doe. 1'40. Notes Addit. 80 nnrl 01.
Wiegcr 1084 8. : Chav., Doc. 168 s. 4 and 2081. Cf,my article "Chincso
rccords of the Arabs in Central ,\sin" in Lhc Bullclin of tho School o i
Oriental Studies, 11. 018 f.
A hdl aecount of these risit~gsis given by Prol. E. G.Bcorvne in " L i l c ~ i l r ~
History of Pcrsia " vol. I, 308 ff.
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